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BALANCED SCORECARD FOR JOINT INTERAGENCY TASK 






The purpose of this project is to provide a managerial business tool in the form of 
a Balanced Scorecard (BSC) that enables mission accomplishment for the Joint 
Interagency Task Force South (JIATFS) Counter Threat Finance (CTF) Cell. This project 
addresses the following research questions: Can we link day-to-day activities to the 
organization’s strategies through a BSC, and can we assist the JIATFS Cell with time and 
budget allocation?  The project’s method consisted of a site visit, cell member interviews, 
a BSC workshop, and follow-on emails and phone conversations to gather information 
for the creation of the BSC. The authors developed a BSC with 14 organizational 
performance measures related to three performance objectives and three BSC 
perspectives linking the cell’s day-to-day activities to their organizational strategies. This 
project concludes that the BSC is a viable business tool that can assist the cell in 
identifying day-to-day activities linked to strategies, and therefore facilitate resource 
allocation. This project recommends that the JIATFS CTF Cell conduct periodic 
assessments of strategy and activities, consider modifying performance measures, and 
implement initiatives for improvement. 
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 1 
I. COUNTER THREAT FINANCE AND THE JOINT INTER-
AGENCY TASK FORCE-SOUTH 
Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has 
executed numerous operations against very coercive, dangerous, and dynamic enemies 
utilizing a wide range and scope of efforts to include, but not limited to, direct action, 
indirect action, and humanitarian assistance. According to a report conducted by the 
Congressional Research Service, the DOD is responsible for spending the vast majority 
of the $1.6 trillion related to the Global War on Terror.1 The DOD, and the government 
in general, have improved their effectiveness against terrorist and criminal organizations 
over the last 14 years through several innovative programs. One specific area of operation 
for which the DOD has established policy is counter threat finance (CTF). For the 
purposes of this project, counter threat finance refers to policy that dictates DOD 
responsibilities for countering financing used for terrorist, criminal trafficking networks, 
and other activities that are against U.S. interests.2 Current DOD policy for CTF, which 
became effective August 19, 2010, dictates: 
The Department of Defense shall work with other U.S. Government 
(USG) departments and agencies and with partner nations to deny, disrupt, 
or defeat and degrade adversaries’ ability to use global licit and illicit 
financial networks to negatively affect U.S. interests.3 
In addition to defining the objectives of the CTF mission, DOD CTF policy also 
outlines specific roles and responsibilities for CTF efforts and directs commanders of the 
Combatant Commands to establish CTF activities in their areas of responsibility.4 In 
accordance with this guidance, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) created a seven-
                                                 
1 Amy Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 
9/11 (CRS Report No. RL33110), (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), 7, 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf. 
2 U.S. Department of Defense, DOD Counter Threat Finance (CTF) Policy (Washington, DC: DTIC, 
2010), 1, http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/520514p.pdf. 
3 Ibid. 
4 U.S. Department of Defense, DOD CTF Policy, 8. 
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person CTF Cell5 that resides in their region at Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATFS) 
South in Key West, Florida. According to their website, JIATFS “conducts interagency 
and international Detection & Monitoring operations, and facilitates the interdiction of 
illicit trafficking and other narco-terrorist threats in support of national and partner nation 
security.”6 JIATFS is known as the “gold standard” for coordinating interagency 
collaboration.7  
A. PERFORMANCE MEASURES/CONTROLS 
Capturing an organization’s performance is essential for funding and resourcing 
as well as motivating and incentivizing the personnel. Writing for the Harvard Business 
Review, Dan Ariely voices the common understanding, “Anything you measure will 
impel a person to optimize his score on the metric. What you measure is what you’ll 
get.”8 In addition to capturing the metrics themselves, it is essential to understand what 
they mean. The CTF Cell currently uses individual controls derived from the Defense 
Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS) as well as tracking decisive actions on 
an organizational level, but does not blend individual and organizational metrics into a 
cohesive measurement tool. This project considers the individual performance measures 
derived from DCIPS in addition to organizational metrics and organizes them into a 
Balanced Scorecard for improved tracking, understanding and application. 
As members of the intelligence community, the CTF Cell analysts fall under the 
purview of DCIPS which, according to the program’s website, is designed to “incorporate 
all DOD intelligence positions under a single, performance-based, mission-focused 
                                                 
5 The Cell consists of six analysts, five GG-13 level civilian analysts and one National Guardsman, 
and the CTF Chief, GG-14 level civilian, responsible for managing the CTF Cell. 
6 U.S. Department of Defense, “Joint Interagency Task Force South,” accessed February 1, 2015, 
http://www.jiatfs.southcom.mil/index.aspx. 
7 Evan Munsing and Christopher J. Lamb, Joint Interagency Task Force—South: TheBest Known, 
Least Understood Interagency Success, (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2011), 3, 
http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/inss/Strategic-Perspectives-5.pdf. 
8 Dan Ariely, “Column: You Are What You Measure,” Harvard Business Review, June 2010, 
https://hbr.org/2010/06/column-you-are-what-you-measure. 
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personnel management system.”9 The DCIPS performance evaluation system is similar in 
many ways to the Navy’s fitness report (FITREP) evaluation system. The defined DCIPS 
objectives aim at providing a broad framework to direct personnel to produce desired 
results. For the analysts of the CTF Cell, the DCIPS objectives are broken into three main 
areas: “target illicit proceed activity” (i.e., flow of illicit funds); “research, analysis, and 
production;” and, “driving full cycle intelligence process.”10  
While individual performance measures are geared to provide incentives and 
motivation to personnel, organizational metrics are commonly used to justify budgetary 
funding, allocation of resources, and adjustments to mission. These performance 
measures are especially emphasized within a limited fiscal environment, such as the 
current budgetary situation. The CTF Cell highlights decisive actions, such as bulk cash 
seized and arrests made, as primary measures of performance. While these metrics 
highlight the end results that stem in part from their input, they do not adequately direct 
daily activities intended to achieve such results. 
Balanced Scorecard (BSC) refers to a set of measures to include customer 
satisfaction, internal processes, and innovation and improvement that lead to financial 
performance, but are designed to pull employees toward overall vision.11 According to 
Robert Kaplan and David Norton in their 1996 book, The Balanced Scorecard: 
Translating Strategy into Action, if an organizational unit has a strategy to achieve its 
mission, then they are a valid candidate for a Balanced Scorecard. Even though typical 
scorecards contain four generally business-related perspectives, Thomas Albright, Chad 
Gerber & Paul Juras argue with a Naval Aviation example that, “each entity can develop 
its own dimensions of importance.”12 The BSC provides the means for combining 
                                                 
9 U.S. Department of Defense, “Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System,” accessed May 15, 
2015, http://dcips.dtic.mil/. 
10 Obtained from JIATFS CTF Cell Chief during site visit on February 27, 2015. 
11Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton, The Balanced Scorecard: Measures That Drive 
Performance. (Boston: Harvard Business Review Press, 1992), 79. 
12 Thomas L. Albright, Chad A. Gerber and Paul Juras, “How Naval Aviation Uses the Balanced 
Scorecard,” Strategic Finance, October 2014, 22, http://www.imanet.org/docs/default-
source/sf/10_2014_juras-pdf.pdf?sfvrsn=0. 
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individual and organizational performance measures to not only evaluate end results but 
more importantly drive daily activities to achieve set goals. 
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
With DOD and SOUTHCOM policy guidance, the JIATFS CTF Cell is 
challenged to execute its mission with critical, yet limited resources. This project aims to 
provide a managerial business tool, in the form of a Balanced Scorecard, to assist the 
JIATFS CTF Cell in identifying performance measures in focus areas of learning and 
growth, internal business procedures, customer focus, and mission that will link daily 
tasks to strategic goals and vision. To support the objective of enhancing the Cell’s 
performance, this project addresses the following questions: 
• Can we link day-to-day activity to the organization’s strategy via a BSC? 
• Can we assist the JIATFS Cell with: 
• How to allocate their budget? 
• How to spend their time? 
C. SCOPE OF RESEARCH 
The scope of this project is limited to the development of a BSC and 
corresponding strategy map that covers the performance measures unique to the JIATFS 
CTF Cell. Chapter II covers the literature review concerning the evolution of CTF, 
JIATFS CTF performance measures, and the principles behind the BSC concept. Chapter 
III describes the methodology used in our research from the selection of JIATFS as our 
subject through the on-site interviews and BSC workshop. Chapter IV defines the 
separate categories and components that comprise the tailored BSC for the CTF Cell. 
Finally, Chapter V discusses the major findings of the research conducted, potential areas 
of future research, and recommendations for further improvement. 
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D. SUMMARY  
This project achieves its research objectives. First, the project provides a sample 
BSC that links the cell’s day-to-day activities to their organizational strategies. It contains 
14 organizational performance measures of day-to-day activities related to three 
performance objectives. Second, as the BSC identifies and measures the key activities 
performed by the cell, it provides a business tool that can assist with resource allocation. 
By focusing resources on the day-to day activities that are linked to organizational 
strategies, the cell can reach mission accomplishment. Finally, as the BSC readily 
identifies weighted performance measures, it emphasizes areas where organizational 
investment should be made. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review focuses on three specific areas: counter threat finance 
(CTF), JIATFS CTF Cell performance measurement, and the Balanced Scorecard. The 
first area highlights the evolution of CTF and introduces authorities, policies, laws, and 
organizations in the United States and around the globe that help define CTF’s role 
within the DOD. The second area shifts to focus on JIATFS CTF Cell performance 
measurement and explains the use of both individual and organizational performance 
measurement systems through DCIPS and local metrics, respectively. This section 
defines specific performance objectives, performance elements, and what organizational 
metrics are currently being measured. The third segment introduces the details of the 
Balanced Scorecard, created by Dr. Robert S. Kaplan and Dr. David P. Norton, and 
breaks it into the four main perspectives (financial, customer, internal-business-process, 
and learning and growth). This section also describes examples of BSC use within the 
DOD, including a discussion regarding a few recognized challenges of implementing the 
Balanced Scorecard. The chapter concludes with the introduction of the idea, structure, 
and purpose of a strategy map and how it relates to the Balanced Scorecard.  
A. COUNTER THREAT FINANCE 
1. The Evolution of CTF 
The origins of CTF can be in part traced back to Congress’s passing of the Bank 
Secrecy Act (BSA) of 1970 in an effort to prevent money laundering and stay ahead of 
criminal efforts to transform ill-gotten gains into legal currency. Furthermore, several 
other laws, policies, and organizations emerged in the United States and abroad in an 
effort to remain ahead of criminals’ attempts to launder illegal funds. This section 
discusses some of the acts, laws, organizations, publications, and resolutions that helped 
influence and define CTF within the DOD and show how efforts to reduce and eliminate 
the financial resources available to criminal and terrorist organizations have evolved over 
the years in order to address the ever-changing tactics and techniques adopted by these 
organizations.  
 8 
Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 
Approved by Congress in 1970, the BSA “requires U.S. financial institutions to 
assist U.S. government agencies to detect and prevent money laundering.”13 The Act 
requires that financial institutions must keep records of cash purchases of negotiable 
instruments, file reports of cash transactions that exceed a daily aggregate amount of 
$10,000, and report any suspicious activity that may be associated with criminal activities 
such as money laundering.14 Since its inception, the BSA has been amended in order to 
remain “one of the most important tools in the fight against money laundering” and “to 
provide law enforcement and regulatory agencies with the most effective tools to combat 
money laundering.”15  
Money Laundering Control Act of 1986  
Along with stipulating civil and criminal forfeiture for violation of the BSA, the 
Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 made money laundering a federal crime, 
increasing the potential ramifications for those choosing to engage in money laundering 
activities. 
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering 
Established by representatives from Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, 
Italy, Japan, and the United States at the G-7 Summit in Paris in 1989, the Financial 
Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) serves as an international policy-
making body formed to address concerns related to money laundering. FATF was 
initially “given the responsibility of examining money laundering techniques and trends, 
reviewing the action which had already been taken at a national or international level, and 
setting out the measures that still needed to be taken to combat money laundering.”16 In 
                                                 
13 U.S. Department of Treasury, “FinCEN’s Mandate from Congress,” accessed June 5, 2015, 
http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/bsa/. 
14 Ibid. 
15 U.S. Department of Treasury, “History of Anti-Money Laundering Laws,” accessed June 5, 2015, 
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/aml_history.html. 
16 Financial Action Task Force, “History of the FATF,” accessed May 24, 2015, http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/pages/aboutus/historyofthefatf/. 
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2001, FATF expanded its role to include “the development of standards in the fight 
against terrorist financing.”17 Part of the significance of FATF lies in the fact that it is an 
international organization with membership currently consisting of 36 countries and can 
thus exert influence on a global scale. 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
The Secretary of the Treasury established the Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network (FinCEN) in 1990. According to their website, FinCEN’s mission is: 
To safeguard the financial system from illicit use and combat money 
laundering and promote national security through the collection, analysis, 
and dissemination of financial intelligence and strategic use of financial 
authorities. FinCEN carries out its mission by receiving and maintaining 
financial transactions data; analyzing and disseminating that data for law 
enforcement purposes; and building global cooperation with counterpart 
organizations in other countries and with international bodies.18  
In 1994, FinCEN merged with the Department of the Treasury’s Office of 
Financial Enforcement and saw its mission expand to include regulatory authority for the 
provisions of the BSA of 1970. FinCEN centers its central activities around efforts to 
“follow the money, partners with law enforcement at all levels of government, and 
supports the nation’s foreign policy and national security objectives.”19  
Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units 
In 1995, a group of Financial Intelligence Units (FIU), including FinCEN, 
founded the Egmont Group in Brussels, Belgium, after realizing “the importance of 
international cooperation in the fight against money laundering and financing of 
terrorism.”20 The group’s goal, according to their website, is “to provide a forum for 
FIUs around the world to improve cooperation in the fight against money laundering and 
the financing of terrorism and to foster the implementation of domestic programs in this 
                                                 
17 Financial Action Task Force, “History of the FATF.” 
18 U.S. Department of Treasury, “What We Do,” accessed June 5, 2015, 
http://www.fincen.gov/about_fincen/wwd/index.html. 
19 Ibid. 
20 The Egmont Group, “About,” accessed May 25, 2015, http://www.egmontgroup.org/about. 
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field.”21 As with FATF, part of the Egmont Group’s significance relates to its 
international influence and membership, with over 130 FIUs from various countries. 
Executive Order 13224 (2001) 
President George W. Bush signed Executive Order 13224 on September 23, 2001 
in response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The Order: 
…provides a means by which to disrupt the financial support network for 
terrorists and terrorist organizations by authorizing the U.S. government to 
designate and block the assets of foreign individuals and entities that 
commit, or pose a significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism. In 
addition, because of the pervasiveness and expansiveness of the financial 
foundations of foreign terrorists, the Order authorizes the U.S. government 
to block the assets of individuals and entities that provide support, 
services, or assistance to, or otherwise associate with, terrorists and 
terrorist organizations designated under the Order, as well as their 
subsidiaries, front organizations, agents, and associates.22  
The order directly targeted the property and transactions of individuals linked to 
terrorism. 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373  
On September 28, 2001, the United Nations (UN) adopted Security Council 
Resolution 1373 that “called for UN member states to work together to suppress terrorist 
financing, share intelligence on terrorism, monitor borders, and implement...the relevant 
international conventions and protocols to combat terrorism.”23 The UN Security council 
unanimously adopted the Resolution, illustrating international commitment to counter 
terrorist financing. 
  
                                                 
21 The Egmont Group, “About.” 
22 The White House, Executive Order 13224 (Washington, DC: The White House, 2001), 
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/122570.htm. 
23 United Nations, “Security Council Unanimously Adopts Wide-Ranging Anti-Terrorism Resolution; 
Calls for Suppressing Financing, Improving International Cooperation,” accessed May 30, 2015, 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2001/sc7158.doc.htm. 
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USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 
President George W. Bush signed the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 into law on 
October 26, 2001. The Act expanded various organizations’ tools and options available 
for the interception and obstruction of terrorism. Title III of the Act was known as the 
International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001. It 
contained regulation and amendments related to money laundering, amended the BSA of 
1970 to focus on terrorist financing in addition to money laundering, provided new 
regulations concerning currency crimes, and established FinCEN as a bureau within the 
Department of Treasury (Treasury). Some provisions of the Act expired on June 1, 2015, 
but were reinstituted by the passing of the USA Freedom Act on June 2, 2015. However, 
the USA Freedom Act amends Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, effectively ending 
the National Security Administration’s collection of phone data. The USA Freedom Act 
continues to provide organizations with various tools and options to obstruct terrorism.   
Council on Foreign Relations Task Force Report on Terrorist Financing 
The Council on Foreign Relations’ (CFR) task force released its report concerning 
terrorist financing in 2002. The report indicated that “After an initially robust attempt to 
curtail financing for international terrorism, the Bush administration’s current efforts are 
strategically inadequate to assure the sustained results needed to protect U.S. security,” 
and suggested that “the United States should lead an initiative to create a new 
international organization dedicated solely to curbing terrorist financing.”24 Additionally, 
the CFR Task Force determined “the U.S. national security community at the time was 
woefully unprepared to understand and [adequately] attack terrorist finance networks, 
noting among other failures the lack of coordination among the several national security 
agencies.”25 The report’s findings helped to initiate coordination efforts among various 
                                                 
24 Maurice R. Greenberg, William F. Wechsler and Lee S. Wolosky, Terrorist Financing: Report of an 
Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations (New York, NY: CFR, 2002), v-
vi, http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-financing/terrorist-financing/p5080. 
25 J. Edward Conway, “Analysis in Combat: The Deployed Threat Finance Analyst,” Small Wars 
Journal 8, no. 7 (2012), http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/analysis-in-combat-the-deployed-threat-
finance-analyst. 
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agencies and also led to “an exponential growth in the attention that the U.S. intelligence 
community has paid to global terrorist finance networks.”26  
The 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America  
The 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) specifically highlights cutting of 
terrorist financing as a method to defeat the threat posed by terrorism. The 2002 NSS 
expands on this notion stating: 
The United States will continue to work with our allies to disrupt the 
financing of terrorism. We will identify and block the sources of funding 
for terrorism, freeze the assets of terrorists and those who support them, 
deny terrorists access to the international financial system, protect 
legitimate charities from being abused by terrorists, and prevent the 
movement of terrorists’ assets through alternative financial networks.27  
The 2002 NSS focused on the perceived threats to national security at the time 
and dictated how they should be addressed, including a focus on terrorist financing. 
9/11 Commission Report (2004) 
On November 27, 2002, Congress and President Bush created the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States “to prepare a full and complete 
account of the circumstances surrounding the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, 
including preparedness for and the immediate response to the attacks.”28 The 
Commission was also tasked with providing recommendations to prevent such attacks in 
the future. In order to assist the Commission with preparing the report, teams prepared 
specialized studies known as monographs for the Commission’s consideration. One such 
monograph on terrorist financing determined that “following the money to identify 
terrorist operatives and sympathizers provides a particularly powerful tool in the fight 
                                                 
26 Conway, “Analysis in Combat.” 
27 The White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: The White House, 2002), 6, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf. 
28 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, “9–11 Commission Report,” last 
modified August 21, 2004, http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/. 
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against terrorist groups,” thus identifying a possible method of preventing future terrorist 
attacks.29  
Emergence of the Iraq and Afghan Threat Finance Cells 
The Iraq Threat Finance Cell was created in 2005 at the recommendation of the 
National Security Council. Located in Baghdad, the interagency cell was led by the 
Treasury and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and “performed financial intelligence 
analysis concerning insurgent and terrorist elements in Iraq and collected, processed, and 
disseminated financial intelligence to support efforts to detect, identify, and disrupt 
insurgent or terrorist elements.”30 As priorities shifted from Iraq to Afghanistan in 2008, 
interest in starting the Afghan Threat Finance Cell grew. An agent from the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) assumed the lead with a member of Treasury serving 
as the deputy. The Cell in Afghanistan sought “to identify and disrupt financial networks 
related to terrorism, the Taliban, narcotics trafficking and corruption” and “improve the 
targeting of the insurgents’ financial structure.”31 The cells in Iraq and Afghanistan 
would go on to serve as a model for future CTF cells. 
Department of Defense Directive 5205.14 
The Deputy Secretary of Defense released DOD Directive 5205.14 on August 19, 
2010, which established “DOD policy and [assigned] DOD responsibilities for countering 
financing used to engage in terrorism, illicit trafficking networks, and related activities 
that support an adversary’s ability to negatively affect U.S. interests.”32  
This directive defines CTF as  
                                                 
29 John Roth, Douglas Greenburg and Serena Wille, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States: Monograph on Terrorist Financing (Washington, DC: GPO, 2004), 2, 
http://www.911commission.gov/staff_statements/911_TerrFin_Monograph.pdf. 
30 U.S. Department of Treasury, “Office of Intelligence and Analysis,” accessed June 18, 2015, 
http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Terrorism-Fin-Intel/Documents/oia-
brochure.pdf. 
31 U.S. Department of Treasury, “Fact Sheet: Combating the Financing of Terrorism, Disrupting 
Terrorism at its Core,” last modified September 8, 2011, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/tg1291.aspx. 
32 U.S. Department of Defense, DOD CTF Policy, 1. 
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DOD activities and capabilities, apart from those included under DOD 
threat finance intelligence (TFI), to deny, disrupt, destroy, or defeat 
finance systems and networks that negatively affect U.S. interests in 
compliance with all existing authorities and procedures. This includes 
those activities and capabilities undertaken with other Government 
agencies and/or partner nations. DOD CTF counters financing used to 
engage in terrorist activities and illicit networks that traffic narcotics, 
WMD, Improvised Explosive Devices, other weapons, persons, precursor 
chemicals, and related activities that support an adversary’s ability to 
negatively affect U.S. interests.33  
The Directive applies to all DOD components, mandates DOD policy concerning 
CTF, and outlines the responsibilities of the various DOD components related to CTF. It 
specifically mandates that the DOD “shall work with other U.S. Government (USG) 
departments and agencies and with partner nations to deny, disrupt, or defeat and degrade 
adversaries’ ability to use global licit and illicit financial networks to negatively affect 
U.S. interests.”34  
Some other significant provisions of the Directive include naming Commander 
U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) as the “DOD CTF lead component for 
synchronizing DOD CTF activities” and direction for the Commanders of the Combatant 
Commands (CCMD) to “establish a dedicated DOD CTF capability approved by the Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) that integrates intelligence and operations, 
analyzes financial intelligence, and coordinates the execution of DOD CTF activities in 
accordance with existing authorities, regulations, and CCMD initiatives.”35 In 
accordance with DOD Directive 5202.14, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) 
created six permanent CTF billets, all of which currently reside in the JIATFS CTF Cell. 
Commander’s Handbook on Counter Threat Finance 
Recognizing that only a small amount of doctrinal guidance related to CTF was 
available, the Joint Staff, J-7, released the Commander’s Handbook on Counter Threat 
Finance in September of 2011. In his “Message to Joint Warfighters,” Major General 
                                                 
33 U.S. Department of Defense, DOD CTF Policy, 11. 
34 Ibid., 1. 
35 Ibid., 8. 
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Frederick Rudesheim describes the intent of the document as a “pre-doctrinal handbook 
to help joint force commanders and their staffs understand the scope and importance of 
CTF and provide information and guidance on its process; best practices; planning, 
execution, and assessment considerations; and resources” and illustrates the DOD’s 
continued interest in CTF.36  
The 2015 National Security Strategy of the United States of America 
The 2015 National Security Strategy declares “Violent extremism and an evolving 
terrorist threat raise a persistent risk of attacks on America and our allies” and states that 
“Targeted economic sanctions will remain an effective tool for imposing costs on 
irresponsible actors and helping to dismantle criminal and terrorist networks. All our 
tools are made more effective by the skill of our intelligence professionals and the quality 
of intelligence they collect, analyze, and produce.”37 It also calls for the “United States to 
lead international efforts to promote financial transparency and prevent the global 
financial system from being abused by transnational criminal and terrorist organizations 
to engage in, or launder the proceeds of illegal activity.”38 From the language used in the 
2015 NSS, it may be reasoned that CTF will continue to play role in ensuring the national 
security of the United States and our partners. 
2. The Future of Counter Threat Finance 
The process of developing a CTF capability in the DOD was influenced by 
several organizations, publications, acts, laws, and resolutions. The BSA of 1970 and 
other laws and organizations helped to shape and define CTF. The events of 9/11 and the 
efforts to prevent future attacks perhaps had the most influence on the DOD’s adoption of 
CTF as a viable method to deny, disrupt, destroy, or defeat threats to national security. 
While CTF appears to have a role in continuing to ensure national security based on 
language in the most current NSS, it will likely need to continue to evolve along with the 
                                                 
36 U.S. Department of Defense, Commander’s Handbook for Counter Threat Finance (Suffolk, VA: 
JCS, 2011). 
37 The White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: The White House, 2015), 4, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf. 
38 Ibid., 15. 
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threats faced by our nation. In order to continue to evolve and remain effective at 
countering threat financing, CTF cells need a way to measure success. The JIATFS CTF 
Cell may possibly consider the benefits offered by a managerial business tool such as the 
Balanced Scorecard that will focus on and measure day-to-day activities that are linked to 
strategy and mission success. Before we can explore the Balanced Scorecard, in 
connection with JIATFS CTF, we need to understand how the JIATFS CTF Cell 
currently measures individual and organizational performance. 
B. JIATFS CTF CELL PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
The JIATFS CTF Cell measures performance in two ways: an individual 
performance measurement system using the Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel 
System (DCIPS), and an organizational performance measurement system using 
manually produced metrics. We argue that both of these performance measurement 
systems fail to identify and provide accurate measures of the JIATFS CTF Cell day-to-
day activities that drive success. The JIATFS CTF Cell is merely measuring the end 
result of their work and is forgetting to focus on what actions produced those results. We 
must keep in mind the important quote, “what you measure is what you get.”39 In order 
to address this issue, we believe implementing a Balanced Scorecard will allow the 
JIATFS CTF Cell to combine the measures of end results with drivers of success. Before 
we explore details of the Balanced Scorecard, we describe how the JIATFS CTF Cell 
uses DCIPS and its organizational metrics to measure current success. 
1. Individual Performance Measurement—Defense Civilian Intelligence 
Personnel System  
According to the DCIPS website, the “performance management process is 
designed to create a performance culture in which the performance and contributions of 
the workforce are linked to mission.”40 DCIPS allows managers within JIATFS to 
monitor subordinate employees through performance evaluations on an annual basis. 
                                                 
39 Kaplan and Norton, Balanced Scorecard 1992, 71. 
40 U.S. Department of Defense, “Performance Management, Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel 
System,” accessed May 15, 2015, http://dcips.dtic.mil/perfmgt.html. 
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Additionally, these performance evaluations can be used by upper management to 
determine how to award monetary and non-monetary incentives. In the case of JIATFS, 
monetary incentives frequently fluctuate since they are subject to the availability of 
funding. The JIATFS CTF Cell Chief stated that monetary incentives were awarded to 
employees in 2015 for the first time in five years.41 Instability of monetary incentives is 
an issue regardless of the performance measurement system in place. 
a. General Performance Evaluation 
The basic structure of a DCIPS performance evaluation requires at least one, but 
recommends three to six performance objectives, and six performance elements.42 Below 
are the definitions of performance objectives and performance elements:  
Performance Objectives (PO): Information that relates individual job 
assignments or position responsibilities/accomplishments to performance 
elements, standards and the mission, goals, and objectives of the 
Component. 
Performance Element (PE): A standard set of behaviors for all DCIPS 
positions derived from analysis of the work being performed by 
employees that are necessary for successful performance of that work. (1) 
Accountability for Results, (2) Communication, (3) Critical Thinking, (4) 
Engagement and Collaboration, (5) Personal Leadership and Integrity, and 
(6) Technical Expertise. DCIPS supervisors and managers will be 
evaluated on the managerial portion of the first four elements. In lieu of 
the last two elements, they will be evaluated on their Leadership and 
Integrity and Managerial Proficiency.43 
The process for the JIATFS CTF Cell performance evaluation can be broken 
down into four parts. First, the employee conducts a self-evaluation for the performance 
period and assigns a 1–5 rating for each performance objective and performance element. 
Figure 1 defines the DCIPS rating descriptors. Second, the Rating Official (i.e., 
employee’s manager) completes an evaluation on the employee’s performance and 
                                                 
41 Email message from JIATFS CTF Cell Chief, June 4, 2015. 
42 U.S. Department of Defense, “Writing Effective Performance Objectives Fact Sheet,” Defense 
Civilian Intelligence Personnel System, last modified June 2009, 
http://dcips.dtic.mil/documents/PerfObjectivesFS.pdf. 
43 U.S. Department of Defense, “Glossary,” Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System, accessed 
May 15, 2015, http://dcips.dtic.mil/glossary.html. 
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assigns his/her own 1–5 rating for each performance objective and performance element. 
Third, an Overall Rating for the employee is calculated using the weighted mean of the 
employee’s Objective Rating (60%) and Element Rating (40%).44 Fourth, the employee’s 
Performance Evaluation of Record is determined using an overall rating range provided 
in the DCIPS process.  
Figure 1.  DCIPS Performance Objectives and Element Rating Descriptors 
 
From U.S. Department of Defense, “Rating Scales,” Defense Civilian 
Intelligence Personnel System, accessed May 15, 2015, 
http://dcips.dtic.mil/documents/RatingScales.pdf.  
                                                 
44 U.S. Department of Defense, User Guide for Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System 
(DCIPS) Compensation Workbench (CWB) and Data Extract Creation Tool (Washington, DC: GPO, 
2014), 32, http://dcips.dtic.mil/documents/DCIPS_CWB_User_Guide_Fall_2014_FINAL.pdf. 
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After each cell member is assigned a performance rating in all associated 
objectives and the across the six elements, the performance evaluation of record is 
computed.45  The following is an example of this computation: 
An employee is rated outstanding (5) in three associated performance 
objectives and successful (3) in all six performance elements. The overall 
performance objective and element rating is 5 and 3, respectively. After 
applying the 60/40 objective-to-element weight ratio to these overall 
performance objective and element ratings, it yields an overall 
performance evaluation of record rating of excellent (4) after rounding.   
Overall Performance Objective Rating:  5 + 5 + 5 = 153 = 5 (Outstanding) Overall Performace Element Rating:  3 + 3 + 3 + 3 + 3 + 3 = 186 = 3 (Successful) 
Performance Evaluation of Record: (5*0.6) + (3*0.4) = 4.2 ≈ 4 (Excellent) 
b. JIATFS CTF Cell Performance Evaluation 
The six Performance Elements apply to all six full-time equivalent (FTE) JIATFS 
CTF Cell DOD Civilian employees.46 The only minor difference, as previously 
mentioned, is that the CTF Cell Chief is evaluated on Leadership and Integrity, and 
Managerial Proficiency rather than Personal Leadership and Integrity, and Technical 
Expertise.  
The JIATFS CTF Cell identifies three Performance Objectives for the CTF Cell 
Chief and three separate Performance Objectives for the other five CTF Cell Intel 
Analysts. Appendix A contains the full descriptions of each Performance Objective 
provided by JIATFS. 
                                                 
45 U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS) Calculating 
the Performance Evaluation of Record Rating (Washington, DC: GPO, 2011), 2, 
http://www.dami.army.pentagon.mil/site/dcips/docs/Life 
cycle/ER/Calculating_the_Performance_Evaluation_Record_of_Rating.pdf. 
46 Even though the JIATFS CTF Cell consists of seven total personnel (five GG-13 level civilian 
analysts, one GG-14 level CTF Chief, and one National Guardsman), the only personnel evaluated under 
DCIPS are the government civilians. 
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Each Performance Objective is considered a critical objective that each JIATFS 
CTF Cell member must strive to accomplish. However, we see a key disconnect in how 
the Performance Objectives are written and how 1–5 ratings are assigned. The 
descriptions above are extremely detailed, but they do not identify concrete ways to 
measure success in each objective. The only objective that identifies a concrete measure 
of success is within CTF Cell Analyst Performance Objective 3—Driving Full Cycle 
Intelligence. This objective clearly states a requirement for evaluating four Intelligence 
Community documents per quarter and completing one Source Directed Requirement 
annually. For the remainder of the Performance Objectives, the JIATFS CTF Cell uses 
DCIPS performance measurement rating system and assigns, what we believe, is an 
arbitrary 1–5 rating based mainly on subjectivity of management. This provides yet 
another reason we believe the Balanced Scorecard is the right managerial business tool to 
enable the JIATFS CTF Cell to identify additional concrete performance measurements 
that link performance objectives to strategy and mission. 
2. JIATFS CTF Cell Organizational Measurement 
According to the JIATFS CTF Cell, organizational metrics are compiled in a 
Microsoft Access Database file by a single employee who manually retrieves multiple 
data sets from a variety of intelligence systems.47 These metrics are pulled and reported 
to JIATFS leadership and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Counternarcotics 
and Global Threats (DASD CN&GT) as directed.48 The current metrics collected and 
reported by the JIATFS CTF Cell include:49 
• Total detection and monitoring (D&M) Cases identified/supported and 
further broken down into 
• Of the total, how many Cases were targeted 
• Of those targeted, how many Cases were detected 
• Of those detected, how many Cases monitored 
                                                 
47 Obtained from JIATFS CTF Cell employee interviews conducted during site visit on February 26–
27, 2015. 
48 Phone conversation with JIATFS CTF Cell employee June 15, 2015. 
49 Email message from JIATFS CTF Cell Chief, November 17, 2015.  
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• Of those monitored, how many Cases handed off 
• Of those handed off, how many Cases seized/disrupted 
• Total Amount (dollar value of illicit funds/goods) Targeted 
• Estimated Bulk Cash Seized/Disrupted/Jettisoned 
• Estimated Bulk Cash Successfully Delivered 
• Total Requests for Law Enforcement Case Support  
• Individual Searches Contained within Requests for Support from 
Law Enforcement 
• Of the requests, how many led to a decisive action (a decisive 
action is loosely defined as an arrest, extradition, recovery of 
funds, seizure of illicit funds/goods/property, confiscation of 
assets, etc.) 
• Number and description of Decisive Actions 
• Number and name of Cases/Operations Supported 
• Number and name of Agencies/Organizations supported and identifying 
repeat customers 
These metrics are critical in ensuring adequate future funding and resources for 
the JIATFS CTF Cell. In essence, the metrics are indicators of success and it signals to 
sponsors that their work is supporting the overall mission. Although these metrics are 
critical and must be measured, majority of these metrics are the end result of actions 
already taken by the CTF Cell. They do not address the need for forward looking drivers 
of success. For example, the current metrics do not address what enables the CTF Cell to 
support D&M Cases and Law Enforcement Requests. We believe the Balanced Scorecard 
will allow the JIATFS CTF Cell the opportunity to reevaluate their current metrics and 
balance these end results with measures of success drivers. Next, we describe the details 
of the Balanced Scorecard that we recommend. 
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C. BALANCED SCORECARD  
As the importance of performance measurement grew, Dr. Robert S. Kaplan and 
Dr. David P. Norton introduced a new managerial business tool called the Balanced 
Scorecard in a 1992 Harvard Business Review (HBR) article. Their goal for this new tool 
was to, “keep companies looking—and moving—forward instead of backward.”50 They 
planned to achieve this by creating a Scorecard that could measure and balance an 
organization’s performance across both financial and other non-financial driving factors 
while always keeping the future in mind. Until this point, most organizations measured 
success solely on financial performance such as growth, shareholder value, and return-
on-investment (ROI) among others.51 As the business environment evolved, intangible 
business qualities and aspects of organizations such as employee knowledge, customer 
relationships, and business processes became more important and required significant 
attention. Therefore, in an effort to create a balance between the financial measures and 
driving factors, Kaplan and Norton created the Balanced Scorecard which they define as:  
A set of measures that gives top managers a fast but comprehensive view 
of business. The balanced scorecard includes financial measures that tell 
the results of actions already taken. And it complements the financial 
measures with operational measures on customer satisfaction, internal 
processes, and the organization’s innovation and improvement activities—
operation measures that are the drivers of future financial performance.52 
After further research and refinement, Kaplan and Norton wrote additional HBR 
articles in 1993 and 1996, and eventually co-authored their first book, The Balanced 
Scorecard, which they view as, “still a progress report” for a continuously developing 
business management tool.53 In this book, they explain the impact of the Information Age 
on performance measurement and management and how it has driven organizations to 
need a collective and “balanced” performance measurement tool that, “should translate a 
                                                 
50 Kaplan and Norton, Balanced Scorecard 1992, 79. 
51 Kaplan and Norton, Balanced Scorecard 1992, 77. 
52 Ibid., 71. 
53 Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton, The Balanced Scorecard: Translating Strategy into Action 
(Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), x. 
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business unit’s mission and strategy into tangible objectives and measures.”54 After 
describing the business environment and the basic purpose of the balanced scorecard, 
Kaplan and Norton detail how the Scorecard is constructed focusing on four main 
perspectives, as depicted in Figure 2: Financial, Customer, Internal-Business-Process, 
and Learning and Growth and then how companies use the Balanced Scorecard within 
their organizations.55  
Figure 2.  Balanced Scorecard Links Performance Measures 
  
The Balanced Scorecard measures performance of day-to-day activities, 
links them to four perspectives, and answers four basic questions. From 
Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton, The Balanced Scorecard: 
Measures That Drive Performance (Boston: Harvard Business Review 
Press, 1992), 72. 
                                                 
54 Kaplan and Norton, Balanced Scorecard 1996, 10. 
55 Ibid., 43–44. 
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Kaplan and Norton explain that the Balanced Scorecard is not only useful in the 
for-profit sector, but also in public, non-profit, and government organizations. They 
explain key differences between these types of organizations and recognize that non-
profit and government organizations should be aware of the important financial impacts 
such as costs, effective and efficient use of funding, and spending within budgets, but 
they should not be the organization’s primary objectives.56 According to Kaplan, public, 
non-profit, government organizations can restructure their organizational Scorecard by 
combining financial and customer perspectives.57 He argues that public sector 
organizations should combine financial and customer perspectives and form three key 
themes: Cost Incurred, Value Created, and Legitimizing Support, as shown in Figure 3. 
Kaplan clarifies that these three themes assist public organizations in achieving their 
mission by focusing on efficient use of resources and minimizing costs, concentrating on 
the outputs and benefits the organization creates, and developing key relationships with 
sponsors to secure organizational funding. 
  
                                                 
56 Kaplan and Norton, Balanced Scorecard 1996, 180. 
57 Robert S. Kaplan, “The Balanced Scorecard for Public-Sector Organizations,” (Article Reprint No. 




Figure 3.  Themes for Financial and Customer Perspectives 
 
Kaplan recommends combining financial and customer perspectives of the 
traditional Balanced Scorecard and focus on three main themes that lead to 
mission success: Cost Incurred, Value Created, and Legitimizing Support. 
From Robert S. Kaplan, “The Balanced Scorecard for Public-Sector 
Organizations,” Balanced Scorecard Report (1999): 4, 
ftp://72.167.42.190/safetyleaders/pdf/Balanced_Scorecard_for_Public_Sec
tor_Organizations_HBR_111599.pdf.  
In the next seven subsections, we define each of the four Balanced Scorecard 
perspectives and expand on the basic questions they answer as presented by Kaplan and 
Norton. Throughout each perspective, we explain how the Balanced Scorecard can be 
modified for use in the public, non-profit, and government sector. Next, we provide an 
example of a Balanced Scorecard developed by Dr. Thomas L. Albright, Commander 
Chad A. Gerber (United States Navy), and Dr. Paul Juras showing how the Scorecard can 
be modified for use in a DOD organization where mission success and readiness are top 
objectives. Then, we identify a few key challenges that the Balanced Scorecard 
experiences. Finally, we show that the Balanced Scorecard has evolved to measure 
strategy and how a strategy map can be beneficial to any organization. 
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1. Financial Perspective 
In publicly traded and private-for-profit companies, one of the most important 
objectives is to increase the bottom line on its balance sheet and show continuous 
profitability. Kaplan and Norton introduce the Financial Perspective, which asks the 
question, “How do we look to shareholders?”58 By strategically listing the financial 
perspective at the top of the Scorecard, they clearly show that all other perspectives, 
objectives, and performance measures, “should be part of a link of cause-and-effect 
relationships that culminate in improving financial performance.”59 Through Kaplan and 
Norton’s detailed description of the cause-and-effect relationship, they further identify 
financial measures (within the financial perspective) as, “outcome measures (lagging 
indicators).”60 These lagging indicators are then linked and affected by other perspective 
measures in the Balanced Scorecard known as “performance drivers (leading 
indicators).”61 They explain that any change or operational improvement taken by a 
company should ultimately lead to increased financial performance. If the 
implementation of operational alterations does not result in improved financial 
performance, company executives should either review their overall strategy, or consider 
a revision of the changes made.62  
Kaplan and Norton also stress the importance of choice when it comes to financial 
measurements or metrics within this perspective because it is greatly dependent on the 
stage of a business’s life cycle.63 They go on to describe a few financial measures: cash 
flow, return on investments (ROI), and revenue growth among many others. If a company 
is in early stages of development, negative cash flows and lower ROI may be acceptable, 
so financial measures such as these may not be the most accurate measure of financial 
                                                 
58 Kaplan and Norton, Balanced Scorecard 1992, 72. 
59 Kaplan and Norton, Balanced Scorecard 1996, 47. 
60 Ibid., 30–32. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Kaplan and Norton, Balanced Scorecard 1992, 77. 
63 Kaplan and Norton, Balanced Scorecard 1996, 48. 
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success or well-being at that moment in time.64 On the other hand, if a company is in a 
more mature and sustained phase of its life cycle, then measures such as operating 
income and gross margin may be a better choice which, in turn, signals to investors that 
they are operating in an efficient manner.65 Kaplan and Norton summarize and reiterate 
that the financial perspective of the Balanced Scorecard focuses on the long-term 
financial success of a company and, “ultimately, causal paths from all the measures on a 
scorecard should be linked to financial objectives.”66  
As previously mentioned, Kaplan and Norton developed the Scorecard with 
private and for-profit companies in mind and strategically placed the financial 
perspective at the top. However, Kaplan also recognized that public, non-profit, and 
government organizations can restructure their organizational Scorecard by combining 
financial and customer perspectives. Paul R. Niven takes Dr. Kaplan’s ideas a step further 
in his book titled Balance Scorecard Step-by-Step for Government and Nonprofit 
Agencies. In his book, Niven echoes Kaplan stating that though financial management is 
critically important, especially in an environment of limited resources and constant fiscal 
oversight, a financial perspective does not take the top spot on a Balanced Scorecard; 
mission and customer perspective should be the main focus.67 A satisfied customer is 
usually a key objective in any DOD organization that provides services. In the case of the 
JIATFS CTF Cell, they are in the business of providing intelligence analysis products to 
numerous customers and answering requests-for-information (RFI). Therefore, the 
customer perspective, which we will discuss in greater detail later, is a key focus of the 
Cell’s Scorecard. 
 
                                                 
64 Kaplan and Norton, Balanced Scorecard 1996, 48. 
65 Ibid., 49. 
66 Ibid., 151. 
67 Paul R. Niven, Balanced Scorecard: Step-by-Step for Government and Nonprofit Agencies 
(Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2003), 33. 
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2. Customer Perspective 
If a company wants to achieve long-term financial success, it must focus on the 
production of and/or service performance valued by current and potential customers and 
markets.68 This is the statement that Dr. Kaplan and Dr. Norton make as they introduce 
their second perspective in the Balanced Scorecard: Customer Perspective, which asks 
the question, “How do customers see us?”69 Even though it is important to remain 
customer- and market-focused, they advise that companies identify specific customers 
and markets, or they risk becoming a company “that tries to do everything to everybody 
[and] usually end[s] up being nothing to anyone.”70 However, if companies clearly 
identify a target customer and market, it will enable them to establish and maintain a 
sustained competitive advantage, which is the key to success in any business. Kaplan and 
Norton identify five core customer measures that companies could concentrate on: 
market share, customer retention, customer acquisition, customer satisfaction, and 
customer profitability.71 They explain that even though these five core customer 
measures are essential to improving company performance, they are considered outcome 
or lagging measures that, “do not communicate what employees should be doing in their 
day-to-day activities to achieve the desired outcomes.”72 With this identified, Kaplan and 
Norton explore more and recognize three customer value propositions: product/service 
attributes, customer relationship, and image and reputation. By selecting objectives and 
performance measures from these customer value propositions, companies will be better 
able to supply the needs of current and potential target customers and drive the creation 
of loyalty and satisfaction.73  
Again, Kaplan and Norton, and Niven all agree that not only is the customer 
perspective critically important to public, non-profit, and government organizations, but 
                                                 
68 Kaplan and Norton, Balanced Scorecard 1996, 63. 
69 Kaplan and Norton, Balanced Scorecard 1992, 72. 
70 Kaplan and Norton, Balanced Scorecard 1996, 64. 
71 Ibid., 67. 
72 Ibid., 85. 
73 Ibid., 73; 85. 
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they recommend that Scorecards be structured to recognize this shift in focus. In 
defending the elevation of the customer prospective in public Scorecards, Niven states, 
“achieving a mission does not equate with fiscal responsibility and stewardship; instead, 
the organization must determine whom it aims to serve and how their requirements can 
best be met.”74 Even more, the ability to restructure the Balanced Scorecard shows just 
how flexible and tailorable this managerial business tool is. In the case of the JIATFS 
CTF Cell, they provide intelligence analysis products to law enforcement and other intel-
requiring agencies. Without customers asking for CTF intelligence analysis, there would 
be no need for a CTF Cell within JIATFS. However, that is not the case; measuring 
customer relationships, customer growth, and customer satisfaction could be a key driver 
to keeping the cell in business with a continuous flow of funding and resources from their 
sponsor. 
3. Internal-Business-Process Perspective 
As companies focus on their current and future customers’ value, they inevitably 
look internally and come to the realization that their superior “processes, decisions, and 
actions” lead them to meet customer demands.75 Dr. Kaplan and Dr. Norton recognize 
these critical processes, decisions, and actions in the third perspective of the Balanced 
Scorecard: Internal-Business-Process Perspective, which asks the question, “What must 
we excel at?”76 In presenting this internal business perspective, Kaplan and Norton point 
out that this section of the Balanced Scorecard encourages companies to concentrate not 
only on their core business competencies, but also on the, “critical technologies needed to 
ensure continued market leadership,” that are directly linked to overall strategy and 
financial performance.77 This is different than traditional performance measurement 
systems which were created to solely bolster current and already existing business 
processes, which inherently lack a forward-looking viewpoint.78 Kaplan and Norton 
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argue that if companies can better identify and develop differentiated products and 
services that are valued by current and potential customers during while also 
simultaneously having an innovative process; it will enhance customer value through 
reliability.79 Additionally, they believe that managers must not only improve critical 
processes that lead to meeting customer expectations, but must also identify and 
implement measures on processes that are required to exceed future demand.80 
When looking at the internal-business-process perspective from a public, non-
profit vantage point, Kaplan and Norton, and Niven do not see any disparity compared to 
private, for-profit companies. Niven sums up the importance of internal business 
processes, affirming that “the key to Balanced Scorecard success lies in selecting, and 
measuring, just those processes that lead to improved outcomes for customers, and 
ultimately allow you to work toward your mission.”81 In the case of the JIATFS CTF 
Cell, they have a number of processes that aid in creating intelligence analysis products 
that support law enforcement; but the challenge lies in identifying the key processes and 
measuring those on the Scorecard.  
4. Learning and Growth Perspective 
Kaplan and Norton focused the first three perspectives of the Balanced Scorecard 
on how companies can reach a level of superior performance and financial breakthrough 
by identifying cause-and-effect relationships in internal-business-process and customer 
demands. However, Kaplan and Norton purposely left the fourth and final perspective for 
last: Learning and Growth Perspective, which asks the question, “Can we continue to 
improve and create value?”82 They strategically placed this perspective at the bottom of 
the scorecard because objectives within the learning and growth perspective are the 
foundation of the Balanced Scorecard. These learning and growth objectives are 
described as, “the drivers for achieving excellent outcomes in the first three scorecard 
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perspectives.”83 Kaplan and Norton expound that the learning and growth perspective 
focuses on three specific principal categories: employee capabilities, information systems 
capabilities, and motivation, empowerment, and alignment.84 In revealing these three 
categories, the Balanced Scorecard inventors show that companies must pay keen 
attention to measurements such as, but not limited to: employee satisfaction surveys, 
employee retention and length of average employment, employee productivity in the 
form of revenue per employee, ability to reskill employees rapidly, and motivation of the 
work force measured by number of employee suggestions.85 Even though Kaplan and 
Norton give details and examples of the Learning and Growth Perspective categories and 
measures, we believe they highlight their main intention of this perspective in the 
following quotation when they state a challenge for managers of organizations:  
[Managers] often found it difficult to sustain investments to enhance the 
capability of their people, systems, and organizational processes… so 
cutbacks in these investments are an easy way to produce incremental 
short-term earnings. The long-term consequences of consistent failure to 
enhance employee, systems and organizational capabilities will not show 
up in the short run, and when they do, these managers reason, it may be on 
somebody else’s “watch.”86 
This statement clearly highlights the critical link between all four Balanced 
Scorecard perspectives. If managers and organizations recognize the importance of 
monitoring and improving investment in learning and growth of employees, it will have a 
positive effect on the other perspectives ultimately increasing overall financial 
performance. 
Just as with the internal-business-process perspective, Kaplan and Norton, and 
Niven all agree that there are no significant differences between public, non-profit 
organizations and private, for-profit companies when it comes to the learning and growth 
perspective. Niven recognizes that public organizations “rely heavily on the skills, 
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dedication, and alignment of their staff to achieve their socially important goal.”87 In the 
case of the JIATFS CTF Cell, a small organizational footprint allows more collaborative 
work on cases, but it also puts additional demand on each employee to be an expert in 
CTF and intel analysis. Additionally, from our CTF literature review, we know the 
demand for CTF is rising and therefore the JIATFS CTF Cell members need to flexible, 
willing, and able to learn the new ways adversaries are financing their illicit activities. 
5. DOD Use of the Balanced Scorecard 
Dr. Tom Albright, CDR Chad Gerber, and Dr. Paul Juras published a cover story 
in the Strategic Finance Magazine (October 2014 issue) titled How Naval Aviation Uses 
the Balanced Scorecard, in which they redesigned the traditional Balanced Scorecard for 
use in an United States Navy F/A-18 Strike Fighter Squadron. In this article, Albright, 
Gerber, and Juras are the first authors to publish an example of how operational 
commands within DOD can alter and use the Balanced Scorecard. Similar to what Dr. 
Norton states in his 1999 Report on Public-Sector Organizations, they argue that the 
learning and growth and internal process perspectives are similar to for-profit 
organization Scorecards, but they begin to diverge at the customer and financial 
perspectives.88 They state that DOD organizations such as the U.S. Navy focus primarily 
on a “readiness” perspective to meet mission success.89 Below are the three main 
modifications that Albright, Gerber, and Juras made when restructuring the Balanced 
Scorecard for strike fighter squadrons: 
1. Replace the customer and financial perspectives with organizational levels 
who are responsible for readiness: Learning and Growth (Squadron 
Commander), Internal Business Process (Squadron Commander), Strike 
Group and Air Wing Readiness (Admiral/Commander) 
2. Pilot training is classified as an Internal Business Process rather than 
Learning and Growth since training is part of daily internal business 
required for aviation. 
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3. Various maintenance crew inspections are classified as Learning and 
Growth rather than Internal Business Process outcomes since they contain 
a major teaching and learning opportunity. 90 
By modifying the Balanced Scorecard, Albright, Gerber, and Juras show how 
defense sector organizations, such as the Naval Aviation community within DOD, can 
use a managerial business tool to link and measure day-to-day performance to 
organizational strategy. 
This method of Balanced Scorecard restructuring in conjunction with the thoughts 
of Kaplan and Norton, and Niven on adjusting perspectives for public, non-profit 
organizations is applicable to creating a Scorecard for the JIATFS CTF Cell. However, 
even though it may sound simple, there are some key challenges that organizations 
encounter when creating and implementing Scorecards. We will explore these Balanced 
Scorecard challenges next. 
6. Balanced Scorecard Challenges 
The Balanced Scorecard, just like other performance and management 
measurement systems, has key challenges that are recognized by many business 
professionals, academics, and organizations. Below are a few of the key challenges of the 
Balanced Scorecard that we will briefly explain: 
1. Iterative and time consuming process  
2. Performance measurement is hard and often arbitrary 
3. Incorrect mission and strategy cascade 
 
The first challenge identified is that the Balanced Scorecard requires an iterative 
and time consuming process to design, implement, and refine all perspectives, objectives, 
measures, targets, and initiatives. Kaplan and Norton’s experience leads them to 
recommend a 16-week timeline for an organization to implement their first Balanced 
Scorecard.91 Kaplan and Norton highlight quite a few assumptions in presenting this 
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timeline: strategy is formed, market and customer research is complete, and dedicated 
senior executives and groups that are available to conduct interviews, participate in 
workshops, and attend meetings.92 In addition, they recognize the Balanced Scorecard is 
an organic document that needs to be consistently reviewed and refined. Just as they 
stated in their Preface of the first book, the Balanced Scorecard has evolved over time 
and therefore an initial Balanced Scorecard is not the final product.93 Other Balanced 
Scorecard advocates, such as Niven, agree with Kaplan and Norton in regards to 
meticulous and continuous timelines to develop, implement, and refine organizational 
Scorecards. In his rendition of a timeline, Niven provides a 20-week schedule for 
government and non-profit organizations along with a checklist to track Scorecard 
readiness before implementation.94 He also agrees that the development of this 
managerial business tool requires continuous engagement, “The Scorecard is not 
something to be ‘picked away at’ as time permits.”95 Even more, Niven suggests results 
and of Balanced Scorecard be reviewed “at least quarterly, but even more frequently, 
monthly for example, if feasible.”96 As markets and customers readily change, it is 
inevitable that organizations will need to rethink strategy, change objectives, measures, 
and targets within the Scorecard in order remain relevant and competitive. 
The second challenge of the Balanced Scorecard is that performance measurement 
is hard and often arbitrary.97 Marshall W. Meyer wrote Rethinking Performance 
Measurement and introduced another performance measurement tool, the activity-based 
profitability analysis (ABPA) which he believes covers gaps overseen by the Balanced 
Scorecard by, “focusing on the basics: what are we doing, what does it cost, and what 
will the customer pay for it.”98 By developing a measurement tool focused on these 
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basics, Meyer argues that an organization will not have to worry about finding the right 
balance of financial and non-financial measures, but can concentrate on measures 
associated with the basic business questions that matter.99 Meyer also states measures are 
“often arbitrary (since it is difficult to prove that any one measure is better than 
others).”100 He is highlighting the fact that finding the right mix and match of 
performance measures is extremely difficult and may not be the most efficient use of an 
organization’s limited time. 
The third key challenge facing the Balanced Scorecard is incorrect mission and 
strategy cascade. Dr. Kaplan and Dr. Norton identified this fact as they continued to 
develop the Balanced Scorecard over the years and have addressed it through the 
introduction of Strategy Maps which we discuss in our next section. Kaplan and Norton 
recognized the Balanced Scorecard was initially developed to address the issue of 
measurement, but as they worked with organizations and companies implementing this 
tool, they realized it was actually a management tool that should measure the strategy. 
They state “all of the objectives and measures on the Balanced Scorecard—financial and 
nonfinancial—should be derived from the organization’s vision and strategy.”101 Kaplan 
and Norton dedicate an entire book, The Strategy-Focused Organization to explain the 
importance of strategy and how the Scorecard evolved into a management tool that could 
measure how well strategy was being implemented. However, what if an organization 
agrees on the wrong strategy from the beginning? This error will inevitably cascade down 
into all four perspectives of the Balanced Scorecard causing the organization to choose 
the wrong performance objectives and select the incorrect performance measures. These 
errors can prove fatal to an organization if not caught and addressed. Thus, “What you 
measure is what you get.”102 If an organization has the wrong strategy, they will measure 
the wrong leading and lagging indicators. 
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7. Strategy Map 
As the Balanced Scorecard continued to evolve, Kaplan and Norton realized that 
their performance measurement tool was being used to communicate and measure an 
organization’s strategy.103 They continued to refine their business management tool and 
developed a new tool, the strategy map, which they describe as, “a visual representation 
of a company’s critical objectives and the crucial relationships among them that drive 
organizational performance.”104 Figure 4 is an example of a strategy map template. In 
addition to this description, Kaplan and Norton also explain some other benefits of the 
strategy map. First, it shows employees how their jobs and day-to-day activities are 
linked to the objectives and ultimately the overall strategy and mission of the 
organization.105 Second, strategy maps “show cause-and effect links” within the 
Scorecard.106 These cause-and-effect relationships are important when organizations 
want to determine what effects specific actions have throughout the perspectives of the 
Scorecard and their overall impact on the top objectives and mission. And third, “strategy 
maps show how an organization will convert its initiatives and resources—including 
intangible assets such as corporate culture and employee knowledge—into tangible 
outcomes.”107 Kaplan and Norton expand on this third benefit of the strategy map in a 
dedicated article, The strategy map: guide to aligning intangible assets. In this article 
they explain that intangible assets within organizations can account for more than 75 
percent of a company’s value and therefore strategy and the Balanced Scorecard should 
absolutely include these assets.108 Kaplan and Norton offer the following summary 
stating the goal of the strategy map is to: 
                                                 
103 Kaplan and Norton, Strategy Focused Organization, 3. 
104 Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton, “Having Trouble with Your Strategy? Then Map It,” 




107 Kaplan and Norton, Strategy Focused Organization, 168. 
108 Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton, “The Strategy Map: Guide to Aligning Intangible Assets,” 
Strategy & Leadership 32, no. 5 (2004): 10, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/194374134?accountid=12702. 
 37 
Enable an organization to describe and illustrate, in clear and general 
language, its objectives, initiatives, and targets; the measures used to 
assess its performance (such as market share and customer surveys); and 
the linkages that are the foundation for strategic direction.109 
Figure 4.  Example of Strategy Map 
 
Kaplan and Norton provide a strategy map template which depicts a visual 
representation of the cause-and-effect relationships between strategy, 
objectives, and measures across all four perspectives of the Balanced 
Scorecard. From Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton, “The Strategy 
Map:  Guide to Aligning Intangible Assets,” Strategy & Leadership 32, 
no. 5 (2004): 10, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/194374134?accountid=12702. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In Chapter II, we provided a literature review of past and current research in three 
key areas associated with our project: Counter Threat Finance (CTF), JIATFS CTF Cell 
performance measurement, and the Balanced Scorecard. First, we described the evolution 
of CTF by reviewing its history, authorities, policies, laws, and organizations in the 
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global, United States, and U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) arenas. We also discussed 
the future role of CTF and stated that it is a capability that will continue to grow. The 
second area of this literature review shifted focus to JIATFS CTF Cell performance 
measurement where we defined both the individual and organizational performance 
measurement systems that are in place. We argued that these systems are based on an 
arbitrary and very subjective rating system. In the third and final area of our literature 
review, we presented the Balanced Scorecard and its four main perspectives (financial, 
customer, internal-business-process, and learning and growth). We also explained that 
Kaplan and Norton’s initial development of the Balanced Scorecard was intended for 
private and for-profit organizations, but we provided examples of how this tool can be 
used to support public, non-profit, and government organizations. As explained here, 
some recognized challenges of the Balanced Scorecard continue to exist. Finally, we 
briefly described the development of Strategy Maps and how they provide the visual tool 





In Chapter III, we describe in detail the research approach and method to gather 
information required to create an applicable business tool for the JIATFS CTF Cell. 
Following the creation of our MBA Project Group, we decided to focus efforts on CTF. 
We expressed interest in the topic, and many of CTF’s core principles relate to our course 
of study in the Financial Management (FM) curriculum. One of these core principles 
includes an emphasis on “following the money.”110 Any organization conducting 
operations, whether it is a publically traded company or a terrorist group, requires money 
to finance its activities. With CTF selected as a broad topic, we then narrowed the focus 
of the project and decided to build a business tool to aid an organization within the DOD 
CTF realm. This allowed us the opportunity to apply knowledge of FM principles to 
create a business tool for the JIATFS CTF Cell.  
A. RESEARCH APPROACH 
After deciding to create a business tool to aid a DOD CTF organization, the next 
step involved selecting a group that may benefit from its development. As SOCOM 
serves as the CTF lead component for synchronizing DOD CTF activities, we first 
engaged with the SOCOM CTF Cell. The SOCOM cell was receptive to the idea of 
working with us to develop a business tool to aid their organization. However, after 
further conversation, we discovered the cell consists of approximately 30 members that 
focus on strategic level CTF capabilities worldwide.111 The size and scope of SOCOM’s 
cell hampered our ability to develop an adequate business tool for their use in the time 
allotted. We established CTF points of contact at U.S. Northern Command 
(NORTHCOM) and JIATFS, but elected to proceed with developing the tool for the cell 
at JIATFS based on their willingness to support our efforts. 
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The next step involved selecting the proper business tool for the cell. We first 
conducted a cost benefit analysis (CBA) to assist the cell’s decision-making process 
regarding funds and resource allocation. We gathered information from the cell related to 
their monetary costs and conducted research to account for other costs and benefits. 
However, the final product yielded inconclusive results that did not benefit the cell. 
Therefore, we decided to create an alternative tool that may offer the cell more value. A 
brief synopsis of the CBA results can be located in Supplemental A and the entire CBA 
can be obtained by contacting the Dudley Knox Library at the Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS). 
1. Selection of the BSC 
After realizing a CBA was not the tool of choice, we determined a BSC was the 
best option. We learned about the use of BSCs in private industry throughout a number of 
our courses at NPS to include Cost Management, Management Control Systems, and 
Strategic Management. In each course we discussed how the BSC aimed to address the 
growing importance of non-financial measures of for-profit entities and their effects on 
overall company value.112 We also learned that public, non-profit organizations, to 
include DOD, can tailor the Scorecard to support their daily operations. As discussed in 
the DOD use of the Balanced Scorecard section of the literature review, we shared an 
example of how an organization within the DOD can adjust the BSC perspectives to 
reflect operational readiness and mission success as a primary focus. The BSC would 
allow us to build a practical managerial business tool that links day-to-day activity with 
organizational strategy for the cell. The next challenge of this project started when we 
began to develop the BSC structure.  
2. BSC Structure 
When conducting the literature review, we obtained step-by-step guides on how to 
build a Balanced Scorecard from both Robert Kaplan and David Norton and Paul Niven. 
Both guides are extensive, and we combined key elements from each. At the same time, 
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we used the Naval Aviation BSC developed by Tom Albright, Chad Gerber, and Paul 
Juras for additional guidance in developing a DOD-specific BSC for the cell. Below are 
the key elements we incorporated into the structure of the Scorecard: 
• Mission at the Top: “Public, non-profits do not aim to improve 
shareholder value, but ‘serve a higher purpose.’”113 
• Ensure Strategy Supports Mission: If an organization lacks strategy, or has 
the incorrect strategy, it can cripple the mission. “The uplifting words 
contained in mission, value, and vision statements represent nothing but 
wishful thinking unless accompanied by a strategy.”114 To assist with this 
key element, we completed a project during a Strategic Management 
course that assessed the cell’s current strategy. See Supplemental B for a 
brief synopsis of this project.  
• Customer First: Since shareholders do not exist in the public, non-profit 
environment, the financial perspective is not the top priority, but key 
stakeholders are critical to the continuing existence of public 
organizations. Echoing the words of Kaplan, “public-sector organizations 
should measure their success by how effectively and efficiently they meet 
the needs of their constituencies.”115 
• Internal-Business-Processes and Learning and Growth next: Being at the 
bottom of the Scorecard does not mean these two BSC perspectives come 
last, but actually the opposite is true. Both the internal-business-process 
and learning and growth perspectives are what start the drive to mission 
success. When it comes down to choosing what perspectives to use, Niven 
explains, “Ultimately, the choice of perspectives should be based on what 
is necessary to tell your strategic story.”116 
• Performance Objectives: The key link between an organization’s strategy 
and the way they measure success is through their objectives. Niven says 
objectives “describe what you must do well in order to effectively 
implement your strategy.”117 
• Performance Measures: The goal of the BSC is to measure how well an 
organization is doing to achieve its mission. Therefore, the measures must 
be the right measures. Kaplan and Norton emphasize the importance of 
leading measures affirming, “the art of defining measures for a scorecard 
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rests with the performance drivers. These are the measures that make 
things happen, that enable the core outcome measures to be achieved.”118 
• Set Weights: “Not all performance measures are created equal.”119 
Therefore, it is necessary to assign weights to all measures and identify the 
most important ones if there are any.  
• Set Targets: An organization must continually ask itself, “What are we 
measuring ourselves against?” If there is no target to measure against, 
what is the point of measuring in the first place? “Targets are powerful 
communication tools, informing the entire organization of the expected 
level of performance required to achieve success.”120 
• Build a Strategy Map: A strategy map helps show the links between 
performance measures, strategy, and mission in the BSC. Kaplan and 
Norton state, “a strategy map specifies [the] cause-and-effect 
relationships, which makes them explicit and testable.”121 
After combining these key elements, we had the basic structure of the Scorecard. 
Next, we discuss the method used to gather the information to populate the cell’s BSC. 
B. METHOD 
We determined a site visit would be the best way to gather the information 
required to create the BSC. Prior to the visit, we worked with our advisors to develop a 
common questionnaire, as displayed in Appendix B, for the individual cell members. 
These questions were formulated based on the BSC perspectives (i.e., financial, 
customer, internal-business processes, and learning and growth) and attempted to gather 
more information about the following: 
• How the cell currently measures performance 
• How current performance measures tie day-to-day activities to current 
mission and strategy 
• If the cell conducts procedures and processes that are not tied to current 
mission and strategy. 
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Following the development of the questionnaire, we traveled to Key West, 
Florida, to conduct a site visit and run a BSC Workshop on February 26–27, 2015. The 
first day of the site visit afforded us the opportunity to meet with the JIATFS Intelligence 
(J2) Director, the cell chief, and the cell members. The meetings with the cell promoted 
knowledge sharing as we received the cell’s inbrief concerning how they operate and 
observed their daily work process. We conducted individual interviews with the cell 
members at the end of the day using the questionnaire to guide the sessions. That 
evening, we consolidated results from the questionnaires to facilitate the BSC Workshop 
planned for the second day of the site visit.  
On day two of the site visit, we conducted an interactive BSC Workshop. The 
workshop focused on providing the cell with some background and benefits of the BSC. 
We discussed the cell members’ anonymous answers from the questionnaires and 
illustrated many of the similar responses regarding mission, strategy, and performance 
objectives. The workshop concluded with an attempt to have the cell collectively agree 
on organizational performance measures that enable objectives linked to strategy. 
Following the site visit, we continued to engage the cell through numerous emails 
and phone conversations focused on identifying performance measures required for BSC 
development. After the cell came to a consensus regarding the measures, we requested 
the cell jointly rank, assign weights, and set targets for each measure.  
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In summary, our group agreed on CTF as a broad project topic based on the desire 
to learn more about the subject and some characteristics it shares with the FM 
community. We decided to develop a business tool to aid a CTF organization in the DOD 
and established a working relationship with a cell small enough to allow a thorough 
product. We decided that the best tool for the cell was a BSC because it highlights the 
importance of both financial and non-financial performance measures and links them 
directly to strategy ultimately leading to mission success. We formulated a questionnaire 
with our advisors and conducted a site visit focused on knowledge sharing, observing the 
cell’s work process, interviewing the cell members, and conducting a BSC Workshop. 
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The workshop provided the cell with BSC background and benefits, presented the cell 
with the most common responses from the questionnaire, and attempted to identify 
organizational performance measures. After the site visit, we worked with the cell 
through email and phone conversation to finalize a list of performance measures, rank 
them, assign weights, and set targets. In the next chapter, we discuss the findings of this 
project and the detailed aspects of the JIATFS CTF Cell BSC. 
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IV. JIATFS CTF CELL BSC AND STRATEGY MAP 
Chapter IV presents and explains the details of the JIATFS CTF Cell BSC and the 
corresponding strategy map. This organizational BSC is constructed from a cell analyst 
perspective and only includes cell analyst performance objectives. Although the cell chief 
performance objectives were obtained during the BSC Workshop, they are not 
incorporated into this Scorecard. The cell chief performance objectives apply only to the 
chief and are better suited for an individual Scorecard. Further, many specific daily tasks 
performed by the chief can also be captured by the cell analyst performance objectives 
and measures. 
A. FINDINGS 
During development of the cell BSC, it was imperative to understand the cell’s 
mission and determine how it related to the mission of the JIATFS J2 (Intelligence 
Directorate) and the overall mission of the entire JIATFS command. Figure 5 depicts a 
comparison between the stated missions of the CTF Cell, JIATFS J2 and JIATFS as a 
whole.
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Figure 5.  Mission Comparison 
 
JIATFS CTF Cell JIATFS J2 JIATFS 
MISSION 
“Disrupt Transnational Criminal 
Organizations by attacking their 
financial structures/denying 
resources.”122 
“Support the command with 
reliable and timely intelligence 
information and provide 
appropriate indications and 
warnings on the characteristics 
of drug trafficking 
organizations.”123 
“Conduct interagency and 
international Detection & 
Monitoring operations and 
facilitate the interdiction of 
illicit trafficking and other 
narco-terrorist threats in support 
of national and partner nation 
security.”124 
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We determined that by focusing on disrupting transnational criminal 
organizations (TCO), the cell’s mission supports the J2 mission by providing appropriate 
indications and warnings on the characteristics of DTOs.125 This, in turn, aligns with and 
supports the JIATFS overall mission by facilitating the interdiction of illicit trafficking 
and other narco-terrorist threats.126 
1. Cell Strategies 
We examined the cell’s strategies after determining the cell’s mission aligned 
with the J2 and JIATFS missions. Two of their strategies, according to email 
correspondence with the CTF Cell Chief, include “enabling counter-network actions by 
Law Enforcement (LE)” and “targeting illicit trafficking.”  We evaluated the strategies 
using the knowledge gained from the site visit, and concluded the cell’s strategies enable 
its current mission. By enabling counter-network actions by LE and targeting illicit 
trafficking, the cell can help disrupt TCOs. Ensuring the cell’s strategies support its 
mission was critical prior to the construction of the BSC. However, as Kaplan and Norton 
make note, a BSC will not enable the cell to achieve its mission if it is developed to help 
implement incorrect strategies.127 
2. Performance Objectives 
After we verified the cell’s strategies were linked to the cell’s mission, the next 
step was to identify collective cell performance objectives. The purpose of these 
performance objectives is to convert strategy into what Niven terms as “directional and 
action-oriented statements.”128  When we asked each cell member how or what they did 
to achieve the cell’s strategies, every member stated they followed their individual CTF 
Cell Analyst DCIPS Performance Objectives: Target Illicit Proceed Activity, Research, 
Analysis, and Production, and Driving Full Cycle Intelligence Process.129  Again, the 
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129 From Cell Member Interviews conducted February 26-27, 2015. 
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definition of these CTF Cell Analyst Performance Objectives as provided by the cell 
chief can be found in Appendix A. For this BSC, the cell’s organizational performance 
objectives are a mirror image of the individual cell analyst performance objectives. As 
previously stated, it is important to recognize that the cell chief has separate individual 
performance objectives: Supervisor Management, Target Attack, and Integration and 
Synchronization.130  Even though the importance of these performance objectives is 
recognized, this BSC is created from a cell analyst perspective and therefore does not 
include these specific objectives. 
3. Performance Measures 
The verification and identification process for mission, strategies, and 
performance objectives was straightforward since they were all previously identified. The 
difficulty in the BSC development process started when questions were asked about cell 
performance measures. Before our performance measure findings are presented, it is 
important to recap how the cell measures performance. The cell identified two ways of 
measuring performance: an individual performance measurement system using the 
Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS), and an organizational 
performance measurement system using manually produced metrics. At first glance, it 
seemed as though the cell already had the necessary performance measures required to 
populate the BSC. After further analysis, we determined the individual DCIPS 
performance measures contained an arbitrary 1–5 scoring system based on subjectivity 
rather than on concrete measures of intel analyst day-to-day activity. Even though there 
are performance objective rating descriptors that describe the difference between rating 
scores, the differences are not based on a measure of activity. Rather, the determining 
factor between these rating scores is dependent upon individual and manager 
interpretation. This BSC provides a less arbitrary and subjective scoring system by 
identifying and measuring key day-to-day activities. In addition to the individual 
performance measurements, the cell produces organizational metrics reports for JIATFS 
                                                 
130 Email message from JIATFS CTF Cell Chief, June 2, 2015. 
 49 
leadership and the DASD CN&GT.131  The importance placed on these organizational 
metrics reports is warranted, but most measures on this report recognize the end result of 
the cell’s day-to-day activities. The BSC developed in this project not only recognizes 
these end result metrics, but goes a step further and includes drivers of these results as 
well.  
The BSC Workshop reached a stalemate during performance measure 
development. After several follow-on email and phone conversations, the cell collectively 
agreed on 14 organizational performance measures.132  These 14 organizational 
performance measures are listed and are identified by the characteristics of supported 
performance objective, assigned BSC perspective, and type of indicator (leading or 
lagging) in Appendix C. The subsections below define these organizational performance 
measures and provide an in depth description of each characteristic: supported 
performance objective, assigned BSC perspective, and the type of indicator (leading or 
lagging). 
Measure #1: Number of Decisive Actions per quarter 
Measure Definition: Decisive actions are considered actions that produce 
significant results for the LE investigations and/or D&M process such as 
indictments, arrests, or bulk cash and asset seizure.133  This performance 
measure is one of the key organizational metrics reported by the cell to 
JIATFS leadership and the DASD CN&GT.134 
Supported Performance Objective: This measure supports the target illicit 
proceed activity performance objective by having direct and indirect 
effects on the disruption of illicit funding and activity.135 
                                                 
131 Phone conversation with JIATFS CTF Cell employee June 15, 2015 
132 JIATFS CTF Cell organizational measures, targets, and weights were determined via multiple 
emails and phone calls with cell intel analysts from February-June 2015. 
133 Phone conversation with JIATFS CTF Cell Chief on November 17, 2014 and List of CTF Cell 
Analyst Performance Objectives obtained from JIATFS CTF Cell Chief during Site Visit on February 27, 
2015. 
134 Email containing metrics from JIATFS CTF Cell Chief November 17, 2014 
135 List of CTF Cell Analyst Performance Objectives obtained from JIATFS CTF Cell Chief during 
Site Visit on February 27, 2015 
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Assigned BSC Perspective: This measure is considered part of the 
customer perspective because, as Niven explains, it identifies the result 
that the cell’s customers (e.g., LE and internal JIATFS departments) 
desire: decisive actions.136  Even more, it measures only the decisive 
actions that the cell enabled through intel analysis provided to its 
customers. Customers desire decisive actions because they constrain 
DTOs from conducting further illicit activities. 
Type of Indicator (Leading or Lagging): This measure is considered a 
lagging indicator. Decisive actions are the result of day-to-day intel 
analysis and casework conducted by the cell.  
Measure #2: Amount of Bulk Cash Seized/Disrupted/Jettisoned per quarter  
Measure Definition: Bulk cash is the hard cash from the sale of illicit 
drugs or other illicit activity returning to the originating source.137  The 
amount of bulk cash seized/disrupted/jettisoned is another key 
organizational metric reported by the cell to JIATFS leadership and the 
DASD CN&GT.138   
Supported Performance Objective: This measure supports the target illicit 
proceed activity performance objective by assisting in the disruption of 
DTO illicit funding and activity.139 This measure also enables LE and 
JIATFS to conduct investigations and target, track, and potentially 
interdict additional illicit activity.140    
Assigned BSC Perspective: This performance measure is considered part 
of the customer perspective because, as Niven describes, it identifies what 
its customer values:  bulk cash from illicit activity targeted and 
seized/disrupted/jettisoned.141  Customers value illicit bulk cash 
interdiction and disruption because it disturbs future DTO operational 
funding. 
Type of Indicator (Leading or Lagging): This measure is considered a 
lagging indicator because bulk cash is seized/disrupted/jettisoned as a 
result of the cell’s support to the full D&M process.   
                                                 
136 Niven, Balanced Scorecard: Step-by-Step, 33-34. 
137 Email containing metrics from and phone conversation with JIATFS CTF Cell Chief November 
17, 2014. 
138 Email containing metrics from JIATFS CTF Cell Chief November 17, 2014. 
139 List of CTF Cell Analyst Performance Objectives obtained from JIATFS CTF Cell Chief during 
Site Visit on February 27, 2015. 
140 Obtained from JIATFS CTF Cell Chief during Site Visit on February 27, 2015. 
141 Niven, Balanced Scorecard: Step-by-Step, 33-34. 
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Measure #3: Number of Cases Supported per quarter 
Measure Definition: Cases are specific efforts of both LE and JIATFS that 
are tracked in a file and worked, hopefully leading to a decisive action.142  
The number of cases supported recognizes only the cases that the JIATFS 
CTF Cell directly supports.143  The number of cases supported is another 
key organizational metric reported by the cell to JIATFS leadership and 
the DASD CN&GT.144 
Supported Performance Objective: This measure supports the target illicit 
proceed activity performance objective by supporting LE case 
development and JIATFS operations.145 
Assigned BSC Perspective: This performance measure is considered part 
of the customer perspective because, as Niven notes, it identifies what 
customer’s value: support to their case work.146   Customers value support 
to their case work because intel analysis and assistance provided by the 
cell provides them with information that may lead to a decisive action, the 
closing of a case, or the opening of an additional case.  
Type of Indicator (Leading or Lagging): This measure is considered a 
lagging indicator. At first, this measure seems be a leading indicator 
because the number of cases supported enables LE and JIATFS to target 
and disrupt illicit fund movement and activity.147  However, the number 
of cases supported is a lagging indicator because the cell can improve LE 
and internal JIATFS relationships, or find ways to improve quality and 
speed of intel analysis which could lead to additional case support.    
Measure #4: Number of Current or New Contacts Engaged per quarter  
Measure Definition: Contacts are considered organizations, or individuals 
(LE customers and domestic and foreign partners) who the cell engages to 
assist with Intel analysis.148  Current contacts are those the cell previously 
                                                 
142 Email containing metrics from and phone conversation with JIATFS CTF Cell Chief November 
17, 2014. 
143 Phone conversation with JIATFS CTF Cell Chief November 17, 2014. 
144 Email containing metrics from JIATFS CTF Cell Chief November 17, 2014. 
145 List of CTF Cell Analyst Performance Objectives obtained from JIATFS CTF Cell Chief during 
Site Visit on February 27, 2015. 
146 Niven, Balanced Scorecard: Step-by-Step, 33-34. 
147 Obtained from JIATFS CTF Cell Chief during Site Visit on February 27, 2015. 
148 Obtained from JIATFS CTF Cell Intel analysts via multiple emails and phone calls from February-
June 2015. 
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engaged while supporting other cases while new contacts are those the cell 
has not engaged before. 
Supported Performance Objective: This measure supports the target illicit 
proceed activity performance objective by enabling Intelligence 
Community (IC) and Intelligence Agency (IA) partner collaboration.149  
This collaboration allows for information sharing and integrated intel 
analysis which can lead to a more efficient and higher quality product.150 
Assigned BSC Perspective: Following Niven’s classifications, this 
performance measure is considered part of the internal-business-process 
perspective because the maintenance of current contact relationships and 
establishment of new contact engagements is identified as a process the 
cell must excel at in order to be successful.151 Through continuous contact 
engagement, the cell is better able to anticipate any change to customer 
value. Additionally, through discovery of new contacts, the cell builds a 
critical resource network that can be leveraged during the Intel analysis 
process. 
Type of Indicator (Leading or Lagging): This measure is considered a 
leading indicator because it is through contact engagement that the cell is 
able to obtain case work and establish key relationships required to 
improve and expand CTF Intel analysis efforts. 
Measure #5: Current and Accurate Metrics (Yes/No) 
Measure Definition: A list of all cell organizational metrics is listed in 
Chapter II.152  Currency and accuracy is based on whether or not metrics 
are updated with all available information and if they support the required 
timeline established by JIATFS and DASD CN&GT.153  If the above 
requirements are met, then the cell organizational metrics are considered 
current and accurate. 
                                                 
149 Obtained from JIATFS CTF Cell Intel analysts via multiple emails and phone calls from February-
June 2015.  
150 List of CTF Cell Analyst Performance Objectives obtained from JIATFS CTF Cell Chief during 
Site Visit on February 27, 2015 
151 Niven, Balanced Scorecard: Step-by-Step, 35. 
152 Email from JIATFS CTF Cell Chief dated November 17, 2015 containing FY13 and FY14 Metrics 
153 Obtained from JIATFS CTF Cell Intel analysts via multiple emails and phone calls from February-
June 2015. 
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Supported Performance Objective: This measure supports the target illicit 
proceed activity performance objective by allowing the cell to “catalogue 
CTF metrics with a high degree of fidelity.”154 
Assigned BSC Perspective: This performance measure is considered part 
of the internal-business-process perspective because, as Niven describes, 
the collection and maintenance of metrics is a specific process that the cell 
must excel at in order to satisfy higher authority.155 Additionally, metrics 
are a critical way the cell can prove their worth and defend their need for 
continued funding. 
Type of Indicator (Leading or Lagging): This measure is considered a 
lagging indicator because metrics are the measure of end results. Even 
more, the cell provides metrics as required which is the result of direction 
from higher authority. 
Measure #6: Percent of Selectors Run per case 
Measure Definition: Selectors are defined by the National Security 
Agency (NSA) as information such as “email addresses and phone 
numbers… that help isolate the communications” which allow intelligence 
agencies to target further data collection from these sources.156  The cell 
identifies selectors during the LE and JIATFS D&M case support process. 
The percent of selectors run is one key element in determining the 
thoroughness of the Intel analysis. 
Supported Performance Objective: This measure supports the research, 
analysis, and production performance objective by highlighting the 
importance of utilizing “all appropriate sources of information.”157  By 
using all sources of information in the Intel analysis process, the cell 
enables their ability to provide a more thorough product. 
Assigned BSC Perspective: This performance measure is considered part 
of the internal-business-process perspective because, as Niven makes note, 
selector identification and successive collection is one of the key, if not 
                                                 
154 List of CTF Cell Analyst Performance Objectives obtained from JIATFS CTF Cell Chief during 
Site Visit on February 27, 2015 
155 Niven, Balanced Scorecard: Step-by-Step, 35. 
156 National Security Agency, “NSA PAO Statement – October, 31, 2013,” last modified January 27, 
2014, https://www.nsa.gov/public_info/press_room/2013/NSA_Activities_Valid_FI_Targets.pdf. 
157 List of CTF Cell Analyst Performance Objectives obtained from JIATFS CTF Cell Chief during 
Site Visit on February 27, 2015 
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the most important processes for the cell’s Intel analysis and case 
support.158  
Type of Indicator (Leading or Lagging): This measure is considered a 
leading indicator because the percent of indicators run leads to more 
thorough Intel analysis, which may then result in a decisive action. 
Measure #7: Percent of Intel Tools Used per case  
Measure Definition: The cell identified 13 Intel tools as part of their 
“Counter-Network Toolbox” ranging from multiple Joint Worldwide 
Intelligence Communication System databases to open source centers.159 
This measure identifies the percent of these tools used to support each LE 
and D&M case. The cell understands some tools are not applicable to all 
cases. In the case that a tool is not applicable, it is removed from the 
overall count and will not adversely affect this measure. 
Supported Performance Objective: This measure supports the research, 
analysis, and production performance objective by supporting customer 
cases with the “appropriate level of detail and specificity” and assists in 
“identifying and mapping illicit networks.”160 
Assigned BSC Perspective: This performance measure is considered part 
of the internal-business-process perspective because Intel tool use is a 
daily process performed by the cell while supporting cases. The 
knowledge of how to use each tool is a process the cell must excel at in 
order to improve their Intel analysis products.161 Additionally, the results 
of this measure could be used to determine if there are any obsolete tools 
and/or new tools required.  
Type of Indicator (Leading or Lagging): This measure is considered a 
leading indicator because Intel tool use is the first line of effort the cell 
exercises when supporting cases. 
Measure #8: Number of Requests for Information Answered per quarter 
Measure Definition: Requests for Information (RFI) are the questions, 
data requests, and Intel analysis requirements sent to the cell for 
                                                 
158 Niven, Balanced Scorecard: Step-by-Step, 35. 
159 Counter-Network Toolbox slide was included in brief presented by the JIATFS CTF Cell on 
February 27, 2014. 
160 List of CTF Cell Analyst Performance Objectives obtained from JIATFS CTF Cell Chief during 
Site Visit on February 27, 2015 
161 Niven, Balanced Scorecard: Step-by-Step, 35. 
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support.162  According to the cell’s organizational metrics, they measure 
“total requests for LE case support” and “individual searches contained 
within requests for support from LE.”163  For the purpose of this measure, 
each individual search/question is counted as a single RFI. Thus, each case 
can have multiple RFIs. It is especially important to note that the cell must 
be aware that this measure can cause congruence problems between what 
is desired and what is actually being incentivized: desires to increase the 
quantity of RFIs answered may incentivize the cell to sacrifice the quality 
of Intel analysis.164  
Supported Performance Objective: This measure supports the driving full 
cycle intelligence process performance objective by providing answers to 
customer requests which “reduce intelligence gaps.”165 
Assigned BSC Perspective: This performance measure is considered part 
of the internal-business-process perspective because answers provided to 
customer RFIs is the key task that the cell conducts on a daily basis.166  
Without customer RFIs, it would be hard to defend the existence of the 
cell, and therefore, it is extremely important to consistently improve the 
process of answering RFIs. 
Type of Indicator (Leading or Lagging): This measure is considered a 
lagging indicator because the number of RFIs answered is dependent upon 
many factors such as how many selectors are identified, how many Intel 
tools are used, how well the cell understands what the customer is asking, 
etc. 
Measure #9: Number of CTF-related Events Attended per quarter 
Measure Definition: CTF-related events are considered any conferences, 
meetings, training events, etc., in which CTF personnel expand their 
knowledge.167  An example of a CTF-related event is the annual 
Association of Certified Financial Crime Specialists (ACFCS) Financial 
Crime Conference. This three-day event is comprised of a number of 
workshops, lectures, and panel discussions that cover the newest financial 
                                                 
162 Phone conversation with JIATFS CTF Cell Chief November 17, 2014. 
163 Email containing metrics from JIATFS CTF Cell Chief November 17, 2014. 
164 Kenneth A. Merchant, Wim A. Van der Stede, Management Control Systems: Performance 
Measurement, Evaluation, and Incentives, 3rd ed (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2012), 123-124. 
165 List of CTF Cell Analyst Performance Objectives obtained from JIATFS CTF Cell Chief during 
Site Visit on February 27, 2015 
166 Niven, Balanced Scorecard: Step-by-Step, 35. 
167 Obtained from JIATFS CTF Cell Intel analysts via multiple emails and phone calls from February-
June 2015. 
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crime techniques and how to detect criminals that use these newly 
obtained skills.168 
Supported Performance Objective: This measure supports the research, 
analysis, and production performance objective by enabling the cell to 
“contribute to enterprise knowledge development related to illicit 
finance.”169 
Assigned BSC Perspective: This performance measure is considered part 
of the learning and growth perspective because the attendance at CTF-
related events builds cell requisite knowledge in all aspects from illicit 
trafficking to financial fraud. The knowledge gained from these events can 
provide invaluable methods, tools, and techniques, which can inform 
better decisions and improve customer outcomes.170  
Type of Indicator (Leading or Lagging): This measure is considered a 
leading indicator because cell employees are able to keep abreast of the 
most recent tools and financial techniques criminals are using by attending 
CTF-related events. This knowledge then enables the cell to become more 
effective and thorough in its Intel analysis and customer support. 
Measure #10: Number of Professional Certificates Acquired annually  
Measure Definition: Cell members receive professional certificates when 
they are recognized for training event or course completion in an area that 
supports the cell’s CTF mission.171 Examples of professional certificates 
in the CTF community are the Certified Anti-Money Laundering 
Specialist (CAMS), Counter Fraud Examiner (CFE), and completion of 
the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) Counter Threat Finance 
Course.172 
Supported Performance Objective: This measure supports the research, 
analysis, and production performance objective by giving the cell Intel 
                                                 
168 Consult their website for more information on the ACFCS Financial Crime Conference 
http://www.financialcrimeconference.com. 
169 List of CTF Cell Analyst Performance Objectives obtained from JIATFS CTF Cell Chief during 
Site Visit on February 27, 2015. 
170 Niven, Balanced Scorecard: Step-by-Step, 35-36. 
171 Obtained from JIATFS CTF Cell Intel analysts via multiple emails and phone calls from February-
June 2015. 
172 Additional information on ACAMS, CFE, and JSOU CTF Course professional certificates and 
training can be found at http://www.acams.org, and http://www.acfe.com/default.aspx, and 
http://jsou.socom.mil/Pages/CourseInformation.aspx?courseName=Counter_Threat_Finance_Course.  
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analysts the opportunity to “contribute to enterprise knowledge 
development related to illicit finance.”173 
Assigned BSC Perspective: This performance measure is considered part 
of the learning and growth perspective because after receipt of 
professional certificates, Intel analysts are considered subject matter 
experts in the associated area.174  This growth in CTF subject matter 
expertise gives the cell employees the proper mix of skills and keeps each 
analyst motivated.175  
Type of Indicator (Leading or Lagging): This measure is considered a 
leading indicator because knowledge and individual subject matter 
expertise keep the cell informed and aware of the latest CTF advances thus 
allowing the cell to engage and support CTF customers even more. 
Measure #11: Number of Additional CTF-related Articles Studied per 
quarter 
Measure Definition: CTF-related articles are considered open source 
news, books, studies, etc., that engage the cell Intel analysts intellectually 
about CTF or DTO advances.176  An example of a CTF-related article is 
Dr. Shima D. Keene’s 2014 contribution to the U.S. Army War College’s 
Strategic Studies Institute entitled, “Operationalizing Counter Threat 
Finance Strategies” describing how CTF can go beyond financial 
disruption of an adversary and also help predict and prevent a threat’s 
future illicit actions.177 
Supported Performance Objective: This measure supports the research, 
analysis, and production performance objective by allowing the cell to 
build requisite CTF knowledge and enabling each analyst to develop his or 
her own expertise.178 
                                                 
173 List of CTF Cell Analyst Performance Objectives obtained from JIATFS CTF Cell Chief during 
Site Visit on February 27, 2015. 
174 Obtained from JIATFS CTF Cell Intel analysts via multiple emails and phone calls from February-
June 2015. 
175 Niven, Balanced Scorecard: Step-by-Step, 35. 
176 Obtained from JIATFS CTF Cell Intel analysts via multiple emails and phone calls from February-
June 2015. 
177 Shima D. Keene, “Operationalizing Counter Threat Finance Strategies” (Strategic Studies Institute, 
U.S. Army War College Press, Carlisle, PA, 2014), v, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1239  
178 List of CTF Cell Analyst Performance Objectives obtained from JIATFS CTF Cell Chief during 
Site Visit on February 27, 2015. 
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Assigned BSC Perspective: This performance measure is considered part 
of the learning and growth perspective as it focuses on the area of human 
capital and CTF skill growth.179  
Type of Indicator (Leading or Lagging): This measure is considered a 
leading indicator as the cell expands their CTF abilities and situational 
awareness through knowledge garnered from researching additional CTF-
related articles.  
Measure #12: Percent of Intel Analysts with Language Proficiency 
Measure Definition: For this BSC measure, percent of Intel analysts with 
foreign language proficiency is determined by members with Interagency 
Language Roundtable (ILR) Level 2 in Spanish divided by total number of 
cell analysts. Individual language proficiency is identified by ILR 
proficiency levels through a series of tests in the areas of listening, 
reading, speaking, and writing.180  Department of Defense Instruction 
(DoDI) Number 1400.25, Volume 2016 dated April 28, 2015 states “to be 
eligible for foreign language pay, DCIPS employees must be certified at a 
minimum qualifying language skill level of not less than ILR Level 2 
proficiency.”181 
Supported Performance Objective: This measure supports the research, 
analysis, and production performance objective by allowing the cell to 
leverage language skills to “provide accurate and timely intelligence 
support to Command/mission and synthesize CTF, IC, and IA efforts.”182 
Assigned BSC Perspective: This performance measure is considered part 
of the learning and growth perspective because language proficiency is a 
skill that not only supports the cell’s CTF abilities, but also motivates the 
Intel analysts with a monetary incentive in the form of foreign language 
pay.183  
Type of Indicator (Leading or Lagging): This measure is considered a 
leading indicator because through language proficiency, the cell is able to 
                                                 
179 Niven, Balanced Scorecard: Step-by-Step, 198. 
180 Martha Herzog, “How did the Language Proficiency Scale Get Started?” Interagency Language 
Roundtable, accessed August 7, 2015, http://www.govtilr.org/Skills/IRL%20Scale%20History.htm. 
181 U.S. Department of Defense, DOD Civilian Personnel Management System: Administration of 
Foreign Language Pay for Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS) Employees (DOD 
Instruction No. 1400.25, vol. 2016), (Washington, DC: GPO, 2015), 8, 
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182 List of CTF Cell Analyst Performance Objectives obtained from JIATFS CTF Cell Chief during 
Site Visit on February 27, 2015 
183 Niven, Balanced Scorecard: Step-by-Step, 35. 
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translate documents and communicate with Spanish-speaking contacts 
which establishes relationships.184 
Measure #13: Number of Source Directed Requirements Created per fiscal 
year 
Measure Definition: Source Directed Requirements (SDR), as the CTF 
Cell Chief made note in an email to the authors, are defined as requests 
sent from the cell to information collectors asking for “collectors to collect 
information from an existing source [on CTF issues].”  
Supported Performance Objective: This measure supports the driving full 
cycle intelligence process performance objective by placing an emphasis 
on the importance of establishing CTF collection in the IC.185   
Assigned BSC Perspective: This performance measure is considered part 
of the learning and growth perspective because cell Intel analysts are able 
to build the required knowledge and skill to understand and work the full 
Intel cycle through the submission of SDRs.186  
Type of Indicator (Leading or Lagging): This measure is considered a 
leading indicator because it is through SDR submission that the cell is able 
to receive information from collectors that may support their day-to-day 
Intel analysis.187 
Measure #14: Number of Intelligence Community Products Evaluated per 
quarter  
Measure Definition: Intelligence Community (IC) products are defined as 
intelligence products that have been submitted or completed by other cells 
or agencies.188 
Supported Performance Objective: This measure supports the driving full 
cycle intelligence process performance objective by driving the cell Intel 
                                                 
184 From Cell Member Interviews conducted February 26-27, 2015. 
185 From Cell Member Interviews conducted February 26-27, 2015. 
186 Email message from JIATFS CTF Cell Chief, April 16, 2015; Niven, Balanced Scorecard: Step-
by-Step, 35. 
187 Email message from JIATFS CTF Cell Chief, April 16, 2015. 
188 Email message from JIATFS CTF Cell Chief, April 16, 2015. 
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analyst to “drive follow-on collection and provide feedback for 
collectors.”189 
Assigned BSC Perspective: This performance measure is considered part 
of the learning and growth perspective because the evaluation of IC 
products builds the cell Intel analyst’s critical thinking and furthers their 
analytical skills.190 This critical thinking and analytical skill growth 
enables the cell to perform more in depth Intel analysis on their own day-
to-day case support. 
Type of Indicator (Leading or Lagging): This measure is considered a 
leading indicator because through IC product evaluation, the cell is able to 
build on their analytical skill set, leading to follow-on collection requests. 
These 14 organizational performance measures and their identified characteristics 
are the key to understanding how measures link to strategy.191  Each measure was 
developed keeping in mind the cell mission and strategies, and the cell focused on 
identifying the right mix of leading/lagging indicators to instill a BSC that actually has 
balance. With a 9–5 lead-to-lag ratio, this BSC contains a mix of measures focused on 
measuring the key performance drivers that will ultimately lead to customer 
satisfaction.192  The next section discusses the results of BSC measure weight and target 
setting. 
4. Weights and Targets 
It was Paul Niven who stated, “Not all performance measures are created 
equal.”193  While Niven was referring to the importance of selecting the right 
performance measures, this concept is also applicable when discussing measurement 
weight.194   
                                                 
189 List of CTF Cell Analyst Performance Objectives obtained from JIATFS CTF Cell Chief during 
Site Visit on February 27, 2015 
190 Email message from JIATFS CTF Cell Chief, 16 April 2015; Niven, Balanced Scorecard: Step-by-
Step, 35. 
191 Kaplan and Norton, Balanced Scorecard 1996, 148-149. 
192 Kaplan and Norton, Balanced Scorecard 1996, 31-32. 
193 Niven, Balanced Scorecard: Step-by-Step, 204. 
194 Ibid. 
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a. Performance Measure Weights 
After the cell identified the 14 performance measures, team members came to a 
collective agreement on how to weight each measure. Table 1 provides the cell 
performance measures with their associated weights. 
Table 1.   Performance Measure Weights 
Measure – Leading or Lagging Weight 
3) Number of Cases Supported per quarter – Lagging  20% 
8) Number of Requests for Information (RFIs) Answered 
per quarter – Lagging  20% 
4) Number of Current or New Contacts Engaged per quarter 
– Leading  10% 
6) Percent of Selectors Run per quarter – Leading 10% 
7) Percent of Intel Tools Used per case – Leading  10% 
1) Number of Decisive Actions per quarter - Lagging 8% 
2) Amount of Bulk Cash Seized/Disrupted/Jettisoned per 
quarter – Lagging  8% 
5) Current and Accurate Metrics – Lagging  3% 
13) Number of Source Directed Requirements (SDRs) 
Created per fiscal year – Leading  3% 
14) Number of Intelligence Community (IC) Products 
Evaluated per quarter – Leading  3% 
12) Percent of Intel Analysts with Language Proficiency – 
Leading  2% 
9) Number of CTF-related Events Attended per quarter – 
Leading  1% 
10) Number of Professional Certificates Acquired annually 
– Leading  1% 
11) Number of Additional CTF-related Articles Studied per 
quarter – Leading  1% 
Cumulative Weight 100% 
This table contains the performance measures arranged according to their 
corresponding weights, listed in descending order.   
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The cell decided that key organizational metrics reported (e.g., number of cases 
supported, number of RFIs answered, number of decisive actions, and amount of bulk 
cash seized/disrupted/jettisoned) should hold the majority of the heavier weights because 
they are most desired by the customer. Just as in for-profit industry, the top financial 
indicators are usually the most important and are more heavily weighted. Realizing that 
all of organizational metrics are lagging indicators and are measuring the end result of 
their day-to-day work, the cell agreed to weight some of the leading indicators a bit 
heavier. The top three weighted leading indicators are the number of current or new 
contacts engaged, percentage of selectors run, and percent of Intel tools used. With each 
weighted at 10%, the cell emphasized that quality Intel analysis is extremely important. 
In order to achieve quality, Intel analysis needs to be thorough and incorporate the use of 
all available tools. 
b. Performance Measure Targets 
After weights for all organizational performance measures were established, the 
cell agreed on targets for each measure. This was a challenging task because there is no 
baseline for many of these measures. Therefore, as the organization conducts periodic 
reviews of the BSC, they can adjust each of the performance measures and established 
targets from the baseline depicted in Table 2. 
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Table 2.   Performance Measure Targets 
Measure Target 
1) Number of Decisive Actions per quarter (Number of Decisive Actions in Previous Fiscal Year / 4) + 5% 
2) Amount of Bulk Cash 
Seized/Disrupted/Jettisoned per quarter (Amount of Bulk Cash Seized/Disrupted/Jettisoned in Previous Fiscal Year / 4) + 5% 
3) Number of Cases Supported per quarter (Number of Cases Supported in Previous Fiscal Year / 4) + 5% 
4) Number of Current or New Contacts 
Engaged per quarter (Number of Current or New Contacts Engaged per quarter in Previous Fiscal Year / 4) + 5% 
5) Current and Accurate Metrics Yes = 1 
6) Percent of Selectors Run per quarter 100% 
7) Percent of Intel Tools Used per case 80% 
8) Number of Requests for Information 
(RFIs) Answered per quarter (Number of Decisive Actions in Previous Fiscal Year / 4) + 5% 
9) Number of CTF-related Events 
Attended per quarter 1 per Intel Analyst per Quarter 
10) Number of Professional Certificates 
Acquired annually 1 per Intel Analyst per Fiscal Year 
11) Number of Additional CTF-related 
Articles Studied per quarter 4 per Intel Analyst per Quarter 
12) Percent of Intel Analysts with 
Language Proficiency At Least 50% of Intel Analysts have Language Proficiency 
13) Number of Source Directed 
Requirements (SDR) Created per fiscal 
year 
1 per Intel Analyst per Fiscal Year 
14) Number of Intelligence Community 
(IC) Products Evaluated per quarter 4 per Intel Analyst per Quarter 
The targets are taken from the Cell’s current DCIPS evaluation metrics in addition to newly developed targets as 
discussed during the Site Visit and follow-on correspondence. Targets for Measures 1–4 and 8 are divided by four to 
make them quarterly. 
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Five measures (number of decisive actions, amount of bulk cash 
seized/disrupted/jettisoned, number of cases supported, number of current or new 
contacts engaged, and number of RFIs answered) have the same target based on the 
desire for growth. Again, this is a placeholder until the Cell establishes a baseline and 
realistic, yet challenging, targets.195  Current and accurate metrics are required and 
therefore setting the target was easy: Yes, the cell wants current and accurate metrics.   
There were some minor differences between the two measures of percentage with percent 
of selectors run set at 100% and percent of Intel tools set at 80%. The reason for this 
disparity is that running 100% of selectors is one of the most important processes in 
obtaining thorough information while customer time constraints may not allow for all 
Intel tools to be used during analysis.196  Finally, the cell established targets for the 
remaining six performance measures which are all considered part of the learning and 
growth BSC perspective: number of CTF-related events attended, number of professional 
certificates acquired, number of additional CTF-related articles studied, percent of Intel 
analysts with language proficiency, number of source directed requirements, and number 
of IC products evaluated. The targets for these final six measures were similar because 
this is where the BSC starts to become more finite, focusing on what individual cell 
members contribute to the organization as a whole. It is important to specifically 
highlight three of these learning and growth measures. First, the target established for 
percent of Intel analysts with language proficiency is set for at least 50%. This percentage 
was established based on how frequently cell members must travel to Spanish speaking 
countries in the JIATFS JOA.197  This percentage can fluctuate depending on the 
requirements of travel and partner-nation engagements. Second, the targets for both 
number of SDRs created and number of IC products evaluated are based on the cell 
                                                 
195 Merchant and Van der Stede, Management Control Systems, 313. 
196 National Security Agency, “NSA PAO Statement.”  
197 Obtained from JIATFS CTF Cell Intel analysts via multiple emails and phone calls from February-
June 2015. 
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chief’s direct requirements for Intel analysts established in the DCIPS performance 
objectives.198 
c. BSC Percent of Target and Weight Score Calculations 
When weights and targets are discussed, it is important to understand how actual 
versus target comparisons and weighted scores are computed in the BSC.   
First, actual versus target comparisons are calculated using “% of Target.”  This 
percent of target is found by actual measurement divided by target measurement and then 
converted to a percentage.   % 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = Actual MeasurementTarget Measurement  𝑥𝑥 100 
Of important note for this BSC, each performance measure has a maximum 
percent of target limit set at 100%. By limiting percent target, the BSC prevents any 
single measure that exceeds the target value to skew cascading weighted scores and the 
overall cell’s cumulative BSC score. For example, if the cell had a great quarter and the 
number of actual RFIs answered was double the target, the percent of target would be 
200%. This value would then have a cascading effect on the measure’s weighted score 
and artificially inflate the cell’s cumulative score. The exceedingly high cumulative score 
may lead the cell to erroneously believe they performed better than they actually did.  
Second, we mentioned the cascading effects of percent of target on a measure’s 
weighted score. To compute weighted score, the percent of target for a specific measure 
is multiplied by the designated weight of that same measure.   
 
𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = % 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑥𝑥 𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑇𝑇 
The cell can then take the sum of all weighted scores to get a cell cumulative 
score. The cell can take this score and implement any initiatives to improve areas of 
contention, or use it to make management decisions on how to allocate resources.199 
                                                 
198 List of CTF Cell Analyst Performance Objectives obtained from JIATFS CTF Cell Chief during 
Site Visit on February 27, 2015 
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B. BSC CONSTRUCTION 
After developing all individual pieces (i.e., mission, strategies, performance 
objectives, performance measures, weights, and targets), we constructed the BSC from an 
Intel analyst perspective, as depicted in Appendix D. The figure labeled “BSC Template” 
in Appendix D shows the Scorecard with measures explained, and the figure labeled 
“BSC with Notional Numbers” in Appendix D contains notional numbers to illustrate the 
application of the BSC. This BSC is structurally different from most traditional 
Scorecards in having the performance objectives listed on top rather than the side. The 
reasoning for placing the performance objectives on top is to show that the associated 
performance measures do not fall into one single BSC perspective (e.g., customer, 
internal-business-process, and learning and growth) but across multiple perspectives. 
This BSC was created in a Microsoft Excel document that can be readily altered based on 
any cell organizational changes. Supplemental C provides a few additional details 
regarding the BSC Excel document and gives directions on how to obtain a full copy. 
C. STRATEGY MAP 
Kaplan and Norton highlight the importance of a strategy map as a strategic part 
of the BSC illustrating strategies for value creation.200  A strategy map can be used to 
depict relationships between various perspectives, including learning and growth, 
internal, customer, and the financial perspective. An organization, Kaplan and Norton 
continue to explain, can use a strategy map to illustrate strategies and the links between 
the various perspectives, thus facilitating alignment and implementation of strategy.201  
Following the creation of the BSC for the cell, focus shifted to designing a strategy map. 
As with the BSC, the financial perspective was excluded since it does not translate well 
to DOD organizations for reasons previously discussed. The resulting strategy map is 
included as Figure 6. 
                                                                                                                                                 
199 Niven, Balanced Scorecard: Step-by-Step, 219. 
200 Kaplan and Norton.  “The Strategy Map,” 72. 
201 Ibid., 104. 
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Figure 6.  JIATFS CTF Cell Strategy Map 
 
Notes 1–2 are from Niven, Balanced Scorecard: Step-by-Step, for Government and Nonprofit Agencies, 104; 297. 
Notes 3–5 are from Kaplan and Norton, The Balanced Scorecard: Measures that Drive Performance, 72. The 
remaining information is from the BSC Workshop and subsequent communication. 
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Creating the strategy map began with the cell’s mission, or as Niven claims, the 
“core purpose of the organization”202 as provided by the cell: “Disrupt Transnational 
Criminal Organizations by attacking their financial structures/denying resources.”203 
The strategies that enable the cell to achieve its mission were placed below the 
cell’s mission: enable LE and target illicit trafficking.204  The strategies can be 
envisioned as priorities adopted in recognition of operating environment and in pursuit of 
an organization’s mission.205  In considering the two strategies, it was determined the 
strategy of enabling LE supports organizations external to JIATFS while the strategy of 
targeting illicit trafficking is an internal JIATFS process conducted through coordination 
with the JIATFS J3 (Operations Directorate). However, both strategies enable the cell to 
achieve its mission. 
The next level of the cell’s strategy map examines the customer perspective, or 
how customers view the organization.206  Areas focused on for this perspective should 
support the organization’s strategies. The BSC includes the number of cases supported or 
casework as part of the customer perspective. This applies to the strategy map as well. By 
supporting casework, the cell provides intelligence that enables LE and facilitates the 
targeting of illicit trafficking, thus fulfilling the cell’s strategies. 
The internal-business-process is the next perspective on the cell’s strategy map. It 
considers the activities at which an organization must excel.207  Again, the BSC contains 
measures for this perspective, including the percent of selectors run per case, the number 
of current or new contacts engaged per quarter, the percent of Intel tools used per case, 
the number of RFIs answered per quarter, and maintaining current and accurate metrics. 
These measures were considered when creating the internal-business-process perspective 
of the cell’s strategy map, resulting in the selection of answering RFIs, conducting in-
                                                 
202 Niven, Balanced Scorecard: Step-by-Step, 102. 
203 Email message from JIATFS CTF Cell Chief, November 17, 2014. 
204 Email message from JIATFS CTF Cell Chief, November 17, 2014. 
205 Niven, Balanced Scorecard: Step-by-Step, 129-130. 
206 Kaplan and Norton, Balanced Scorecard 1992, 72. 
207 Ibid. 
 69 
depth analysis, and building intel networks as the areas for this perspective. By answering 
RFIs, conducting in depth analysis, and building Intel networks, the cell conducts 
casework and provides Intel, thus supporting the customer perspective. 
Learning and growth is the final perspective contained within the cell’s strategy 
map and focuses on efforts that allow the cell to “continue to improve and create 
value.”208  Measurements of learning and growth from the cell’s BSC include the number 
of conferences attended per quarter, number of certificates acquired annually, number of 
CTF-related articles studied, the percentage of Intel Analysts with language proficiency, 
number of SDR’s created per FY, and the number of IC products evaluated per quarter. 
For purposes of the strategy map, these measures were equated to CTF expertise and 
IC/regional situational awareness (SA). By maintaining and improving CTF expertise and 
IC/regional SA, the cell is better equipped to answer RFIs, conduct in-depth analysis, and 
build intel networks, thereby supporting the internal-business-process perspective. Each 
level in the strategy map supports and enables the level above it, and the strategy map as 
a whole illustrates the links between perspectives, thus facilitating strategy 
implementation. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Chapter IV not only presents the JIATFS CTF Cell BSC from a cell analyst 
perspective and the corresponding strategy map but also sequentially describes each key 
element used to develop these business tools. The first key elements included the cell’s 
overarching CTF mission and strategies, which must always be at the forefront when 
developing a Scorecard. Emphasis was placed on ensuring the cell’s strategies support its 
mission prior to the construction of the BSC to ensure the final product facilitates mission 
accomplishment. The next element incorporated into the BSC and strategy map was the 
organization’s performance objectives, which explain what actions the cell needs to 
conduct in order to achieve strategic success.209  Another set of elements included in the 
BSC was the organizational performance measures which had distinct associated 
                                                 
208 Kaplan and Norton, Balanced Scorecard 1992, 75. 
209 Niven, Balanced Scorecard: Step-by-Step, 168. 
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characteristics to include the supported performance objective, the assigned BSC 
perspective, and type of indicator (leading or lagging). The final element of the BSC was 
the computed performance measure percent of target and weighted scores which are then 
combined to present an overall organizational score. In the end, a consolidated Scorecard 
and strategy map were developed with the goal to identify performance measures for 
activities that enable achievement of the cell’s strategies, which are linked to the cell’s 
mission.   
The following chapter provides the project’s conclusion. Areas of focus include 
major findings and challenges encountered while creating the BSC and strategy map. 
Suggestions for future research are also provided. The chapter concludes with some 
recommendations for the cell such as conducting a periodic assessment of strategy and 
activities, incorporating additional measures into the BSC, and implementing initiatives 




Chapter V captures the major findings realized during the research and 
development of the BSC and strategy map for the JIATFS CTF Cell. Additionally, this 
chapter discusses areas for future research and provides recommendations for the cell. 
These areas for future research and recommendations focus on enhancing the BSC and 
exploiting the lessons learned during its creation. 
A. MAJOR FINDINGS 
As discussed in Chapter III, the search for a business tool for the cell initially led 
to the development of a CBA in an attempt to assist the cell’s decision making process 
regarding funds and resource allocation. However, the final product yielded inconclusive 
results that did not benefit the cell, and efforts shifted to the creation of an alternative tool 
that may offer the cell more value. 
1. Challenges 
Research conducted about the BSC revealed its ability to link day-to-day 
activities to strategy. Based on initial discussions with the cell, we determined the cell 
could benefit from the development of a BSC and the resulting links between activities 
and strategy. However, certain areas presented difficulties while conducting the BSC 
Workshop and developing the BSC based on the cell’s inputs. Particularly, identifying 
and quantifying measurements for daily activities that enabled the cell’s strategy offered 
challenges. Capturing the correct measures required extensive coordination with the cell 
regarding the measures that should be used, how to properly measure them, and their 
corresponding importance or weight. Further, implementing the resulting BSC may likely 
be challenging for the cell. The cell has limited resources, including personnel and time. 
The current version of the BSC requires manual input of metrics. However, according to 
a phone conversation with BSC expert Christopher Burgess, “Finding measures that are 
automated is key. Manual measures slow down the process.”  Constantly recording 
performance measures related to the BSC creates additional requirements for the cell 
which is already facing time constraints. 
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2. Research Objectives Revisited 
As specified by the research objectives described in Chapter I, this project 
addresses the following questions: 
• Can we link day-to-day activity to the organization’s strategy via a BSC? 
• Can we assist the JIATFS Cell with: 
• How to allocate their budget? 
• How to spend their time? 
The BSC created for the cell, based on the information obtained during the BSC 
Workshop and follow-on interaction, does link the cell’s day-to-day activity to its 
strategies. Hence, the BSC can assist the cell with budget allocation and highlight areas 
where the cell should focus their efforts or time. Performance measures weighted heavily 
by the cell in regards to achieving strategies may serve as the best candidates for the 
allocation of resources including time and money. 
B. FUTURE RESEARCH 
As explained in Chapter II, DOD Directive 5205.14 directs CCMDs to establish a 
dedicated DOD CTF capability. Accordingly, there are multiple CTF cells around the 
globe. The BSC developed for the JIATFS CTF Cell may likely be applicable to other 
CTF cells. While the BSC developed for the JIATFS CTF Cell focuses on their specific 
strategies, similar strategies, objectives, and performance measures may be present 
among the various CTF cells. The BSC created for the JIATFS CTF cell may potentially 
serve as a framework for creating a BSC for other CTF cells across the DOD.  
The current cell BSC is constructed from a cell analyst perspective and only 
includes cell analyst performance objectives. Although the cell chief performance 
objectives were obtained during the BSC Workshop, these objectives are not incorporated 
into the cell Scorecard. The cell chief performance objectives apply only to the chief and 
are better suited for an individual Scorecard. A BSC specifically for the cell chief can be 
constructed using the cell chief performance objectives obtained during the BSC 
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Workshop. Additionally, a BSC for each individual cell member can be constructed as 
each member performs some unique activities in support of achieving the cell’s strategy.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The cell’s resources, such as time, may be too constrained for a full scale 
implementation of the BSC. However, the cell may have opportunities to periodically 
assess its strategy and day-to-day activities. The cell may benefit from determining if its 
strategy has changed or possibly needs to change. Once that is determined, the cell can 
assess current activities to ensure they adequately support the identified strategy and can 
adapt if needed. Fundamentally, the process involved in crafting the BSC may offer the 
cell the most benefit as opposed to the actual Scorecard. 
1. Additional Measures 
The BSC did not capture all of the measures identified during the workshop and 
follow-on coordination with the cell. The cell may consider incorporating additional 
measures into the BSC to include the amount of customer feedback received, funding 
received, and cell briefs presented. 
The amount of customer feedback received can be measured on a quarterly basis 
and focuses on the customer perspective and the targeting of illicit proceed activity 
objective. Feedback from the customer offers the cell information concerning the value 
customers place on the services offered by the cell. It can also highlight activities that 
may need improvement in order to meet customer needs or inform the cell that their 
current activities meet or exceed customer expectation. Feedback can also facilitate the 
cell’s understanding of what activities best enable the customer’s targeting of illicit 
activity. 
The amount of funding received can be measured on an annual basis and also 
focuses on the customer perspective and the targeting of illicit proceed activity objective. 
DASD is the customer who provides funding for the cell, and increases in funding are 
necessary to cover personnel cost increases and allow the cell to continue operating. By 
continuing operations, the cell supports the targeting of illicit proceed activity. 
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Furthermore, by engaging in activities that support the cell’s strategies and mission, the 
cell is able to illustrate its value to DASD and justify further funding.  
Cell briefs presented can be measured on a quarterly basis and focus on the 
customer perspective. The cell often gives briefs that inform potential customers about 
the services the cell offers. Increasing the number of briefs provided potentially offers the 
cell an opportunity to add new customers. More agencies, or customers, may seek the 
cell’s services upon realizing what the cell can offer their organization.  
2. Initiatives for Improvement  
Niven describes initiatives as “specific programs, activities, projects, or actions 
you will engage in to help ensure you meet or exceed your performance targets.”210  It 
logically follows that in order for the cell to reach performance targets, it needs to engage 
in activities that support obtainment of those targets. A specific example involves 
increasing the number of analysts proficient in Spanish. In order to meet the target set for 
this performance measure, analysts first must be willing to learn Spanish. Assuming the 
desire is present, the analysts must then have the opportunity to enhance their Spanish 
skills. This may be accomplished through several mediums such as Rosetta Stone 
Software or Spanish classes. However, implementing an initiative for improvement does 
not come without costs. In the case of improving Spanish proficiency, some of the costs 
include the monetary value of the chosen educational medium and time away from the 
workplace for analysts taking classes. As time and money are constrained resources for 
the cell, consideration may be given to implementing initiatives that require minimal 
resources or implementing those that help achieve the performance targets tied to the 
BSC’s heaviest weighted performance measures. 
D. PROJECT SUMMARY  
This project achieved the two key research objectives. First, a BSC was developed 
linking the cell’s day-to-day activities to their organizational strategies. The BSC 
provides a balanced mix of 14 leading and lagging organizational performance measures 
                                                 
210 Niven, Balanced Scorecard: Step-by-Step, 219. 
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of day-to-day activities related to three performance objectives. Second, this BSC offers 
the cell a business tool that can provide assistance with allocating resources such as time 
and money. The JIATFS CTF Cell is already effective in assisting myriad law 
enforcement agencies in the fight against funding illicit activity. It is our opinion that the 
cell can enhance mission accomplishment by focusing resources on the day-to day 
activities that are linked to organizational strategies. When deciding where to allocate 
scarce resources, the BSC readily identifies weighted performance measures where 








THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 77 
APPENDIX A. JIATFS CTF CELL PERFORMANCE 
OBJECTIVES 
This appendix contains the performance objectives used to evaluate the CTF Cell 
members. This information is taken directly from material provided by the CTF Cell 
Chief. 
 
CTF Cell Chief Performance Objectives211 
 
1) Supervisor Management: Over the course of the rating period provide 
leadership, guidance, and oversight to ensure a smooth running work 
element while maximizing work element effectiveness to achieve mission 
success. Develop and communicate priorities, specific performance 
objectives with success measures for each, and provide feedback to all 
subordinate employees such that all objectives are met by the completion 
of the rating period. Ensure administrative requirements (performance 
reports, awards, nominations, timecards, etc) are accurately completed 
within suspense timeframes. Adhere to merit principles. Maintain a safe 
work environment and promptly address allegations of noncompliance. 
Ensure Equal Employment Opportunity/Equal Opportunity (EEO/EO) 
principles are adhered to throughout the organization. Promptly address 
allegations of prohibited discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. 
2) Target Attack: Ensure CTF Cell is fully integrated into JIATFS mission 
execution, internally coordinating and synchronizing its efforts with 
Operations and Intelligence Directorate, Law Enforcement liaisons and 
other command elements in support of operations and tactical mission 
execution. Ensure CTF is an active participant in the daily battle rhythm 
and targeting process. Place special emphasis on the daily targeting 
process, supporting law enforcement, and supporting the development of 
mid- and long-term operational planning. Maintain a high level of data 
integrity working to ensure case attributes and associated metrics are 
accurate and substantive. 
3) Integration and Synchronization: Ensure JIATFS CTF cell is fully 
integrated into interagency efforts focused on illicit fund transfers to and 
through the Joint Operations Area (JOA). Engage the intelligence 
community, federal law enforcement, and other members of the 
interagency. Working with and through Liaison Officer (LNOs) at JIATFS 
                                                 
211 Email message from JIATFS CTF Cell Chief, June 2, 2015. 
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and independently, seek to maintain a robust network of cooperating 
organizations focused on information exchange and leveraging of 
resources. Ensure JIATFS leadership is kept appraised of significant threat 
finance developments with special emphasis on impacts to the command’s 
mission within the JOA. Ensure JIATFS is represented at CTF 
coordination/synchronization/intelligence meetings. Ensure high quality, 
impactful CTF briefings are provided internally and externally. 
 
CTF Cell Analyst Performance Objectives212 
 
1) Target Illicit Proceed Activity: Aggressively work to disrupt the flow of 
illicit funds either through the Detect and Monitor (D&M) process or 
support to Law Enforcement (LE) investigations. Provide operationally 
relevant information to the JIATFS watch and targeting process. Support 
law enforcement case development. Internally coordinate and synchronize 
CTF with Operations and Intelligence Directorates, Law Enforcement 
Agency (LEA) Liaisons, and other command elements. Participate fully in 
the daily battle rhythm, liaise with the Intel Watch and integrate analytical 
efforts with other Joint Interagency Intelligence Operations Center (JIIOC) 
elements. Establish and maintain a network of Intelligence Community 
(IC) and Intelligence Agency (IA) partners in order to share information, 
collaborate on collection requirements, and integrate analysis. Catalogue 
CTF metrics with a high degree of fidelity. Accomplishment ensures CTF 
execution is fully aligned with JIATFS D&M objectives, illicit domain 
awareness is enhanced, and CTF actions are properly documented. 
2) Research, Analysis, and Production: Contribute to enterprise 
knowledge development related to illicit finance. Reporting in all venues 
shall be substantively accurate, with the appropriate level of detail and 
specificity, tailored to customer requirements, and marked with 
appropriate classifications. All appropriate sources of information should 
be utilized in analysis. Place emphasis on identifying and mapping illicit 
networks, moving the analysis beyond individual events with priority 
placed on information tied to the effective execution of the JIATFS 
mission. Accomplishment provides accurate and timely intelligence 
support to Command/mission and synthesizes CTF, IC, and IA efforts. 
Maintain knowledge and awareness of the proper handling of U.S. persons 
data. Ensure that U.S. persons data is reviewed in a timely manner and 
marked appropriately. 
3) Driving Full Cycle Intelligence Process: In coordination with JIATFS 
CTF Cell Members, J2 (Intel) Analysts and Collection Managers, and 
                                                 
212 Obtained from JIATFS CTF Cell Chief during site visit on February 27, 2015. 
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associated internal staff, drive the CTF intelligence collection process. 
Develop, review, and update collection requirements for your geographic 
and/or functional CTF assignment. Reduce intelligence gaps through the 
creation of Requests for Information (RFIs) to all the INTs. In 
coordination with Collection Mangers, evaluate four Intelligence 
Community products per quarter in order to drive follow-on collection and 
provide feedback for collectors. Create a minimum of one Source Directed 
Requirement annually. Place additional emphasis on sorting and analyzing 
information derived through the collection process, keeping CTF 
Supervisor(s) advised of collection issues. All attempts should be made to 
effectively leverage the entire intelligence cycle and collection system. 
Accomplishment enables JIIOC analysts to accurately and effectively task 
the entire intelligence collection system to achieve goals. 
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APPENDIX B. BSC WORKSHOP QUESTIONAIRE 
This appendix presents the BSC Workshop Questionnaire developed for the site 
visit at JIATFS on February 26–27, 2015. The NPS Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
Chair, Mr. Lawrence Shattuck, determined the BSC Workshop Questionnaire did not 
require IRB review and NPS President Approval on February 10, 2015. 
 
Balanced Scorecard (BSC) Workshop Questions 
I. What do we need to find out? 
• How does the JIATFS CTF Cell (referred to as “Cell” in remaining questions) 
currently measure their performance? 
• How do current performance measures tie current Cell activities to current 
strategy & mission? 
• Is the Cell conducting procedures and processes that are not tied to current 
strategy & mission? If so, what? 
• The Balanced Scorecard focuses on 4 areas: 
o Learning and Growth: “Is the Cell maintaining the ability to change and 
improve?” How is the cell improving its CTF skill set? 
 Does the Cell provide opportunity to expand language proficiency? 
 Does the Cell incorporate latest technologies and CTF efforts? 
 Is the Cell actively involved in attending Working Group Meetings 
/ Travel to gain other CTF knowledge & techniques? 
 Does the Cell incorporate interagency knowledge sharing? How is 
this done and how often? 
 Does the Cell conduct in-house training or computer based training 
(CBT)? If so, through what means and how often? 
o Internal Business Procedures: “Has the Cell improved key business 
processes so they can deliver more value to customers?” 
 How does the Cell do day-to-day business in providing what the 
customer needs? 
 Is there a battle rhythm to the Cell’s daily, monthly, quarterly, 
annual schedule? 
 What obstacles/constraints does the Cell currently experience? 
o Customer: “Do customers recognize that the Cell is delivering value?” 
 Who are the Cell’s customers: DOD, SOUTHCOM, JIATFS, FBI, 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), DEA, Homeland 
Security Investigations (HSI), Partner Nations (P/N), etc. 
 Is there a hierarchy in customer base? 
 How are all customer needs similar? 
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 Are customer needs consistent? 
 How does the Cell engage and build customer relationships? 
 How does the Cell expand its customer base? Does the Cell have 
capacity or show the need to expand its customer base? 
 Does the Cell self-promote? Is the Cell sought out? Or is the cell 
assigned customers by higher authority? 
 
o Financial: This performance measure is still applicable, but a different 
question will be asked – “Has the Cell disrupted/denied TCO finances and 
resources?” 
 Target illicit trafficking.  
 Enable & Support Law Enforcement (LE) illicit trafficking 
targeting efforts. 
 Does the Cell execute its budget? 
 Are the any unfunded requirements for the Cell? 
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APPENDIX C. JIATFS CTF CELL BSC ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
Figure 7.  Performance Measure Characteristics 
Measure Supported Performance Objective Assigned BSC Perspective 
Type of Indicator 
(Leading or 
Lagging) 
1) Number of Decisive Actions per quarter Target Illicit Proceed Activity Customer Lagging 
2) Amount of Bulk Cash 
Seized/Disrupted/Jettisoned per quarter 
Target Illicit Proceed Activity Customer Lagging 
3) Number of Cases Supported per quarter Target Illicit Proceed Activity Customer Lagging 
4) Number of Current or New Contacts 
Engaged per quarter Target Illicit Proceed Activity Internal-Business-Process Leading 
5) Current and Accurate Metrics Target Illicit Proceed Activity Internal-Business-Process Lagging 
6) Percent of Selectors Run per quarter Research, Analysis, and Production Internal-Business-Process Leading 
7) Percent of Intel Tools Used per case Research, Analysis, and Production Internal-Business-Process Leading 
8) Number of Requests for Information 
(RFIs) Answered per quarter Driving Full Cycle Intelligence Process Internal-Business-Process Lagging 
9) Number of CTF-related Events 
Attended per quarter Research, Analysis, and Production Learning and Growth Leading 
10) Number of Professional Certificates 
Acquired annually Research, Analysis, and Production Learning and Growth Leading 
11) Number of Additional CTF-related 
Articles Studied per quarter Research, Analysis, and Production Learning and Growth Leading 
12) Percent of Intel Analysts with 
Language Proficiency Research, Analysis, and Production Learning and Growth Leading 
13) Number of Source Directed 
Requirements (SDR) Created per fiscal 
year 
Driving Full Cycle Intelligence Process Learning and Growth Leading 
14) Number of Intelligence Community 
(IC) Products Evaluated per quarter Driving Full Cycle Intelligence Process Learning and Growth Leading 
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APPENDIX D. JIATFS CTF CELL ORGANIZATIONAL BSC  
SEE FOLLOWING PAGE 
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Figure 8.  BSC Template 
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Figure 9.  BSC with Notional Numbers 
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SUPPLEMENTAL A 
After conducting a cost benefit analysis (CBA) focused on the Joint Interagency 
Task Force South (JIATFS) Counter Threat Finance (CTF) Cell, we could not determine 
hard evidence that shows the JIATFS CTF Cell is directly responsible for benefits arising 
from seizing or disrupting illicit drugs. Furthermore, we could not show direct evidence 
that the cell has improved economic conditions for U.S. citizens by removing illicit 
drugs. However, the CBA did illustrate the cell’s ability to find and direct resources to 
target and interdict transnational criminal organizations. The CBA also provides a tool 
that expresses the cell’s budget in terms of drug user prevention. 
To obtain a full copy of this CBA, please contact the Dudley Knox Library at the 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). 
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SUPPLEMENTAL B 
We evaluated Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATFS) Counter Threat 
Finance (CTF) Cell’s current strategy. We conducted this evaluation by developing an 
activity map, conducting a SWOT (i.e., strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats) 
analysis, and providing the scope for exploitation and exploration. We concluded that the 
cell does their day-to-day job well (e.g., answering requests-for-information, analyzing 
raw intelligence, etc.), but their strategy and current performance measures lack a 
forward strategic focus. We recommended exploring new ways of how to conduct the 
CTF mission in the Joint Operational Area (JOA) which shows added value. 
To obtain a full copy of this project, please contact the Dudley Knox Library at 
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). 
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SUPPLEMENTAL C 
The Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATFS) Counter Threat Finance (CTF) 
Cell’s Balanced Scorecard (BSC) was constructed in Microsoft Excel. This BSC Excel 
document contains 18 separate tabs. Below is a brief explanation of what is on each 
individual tabs: 
1. Cumulative Score Sheet: Lists each performance measure in the BSC and their 
calculated weighted score, which are referenced from the actual BSC. 
 
2. BSC with Notional Numbers: Contains the actual BSC with notional numbers 
and cell equations and references to each measure sheet. 
 
3. BSC Template:  Contains the actual BSC with cells that explain targets, and 
how percent of target and weighted score are calculated. There are no cell 
equations or references on this sheet. 
 
4. Recommendations:  Contains three performance measure recommendations 
that could be included into the BSC. 
 
5. Measure 1 – Decisive Actions: Lists the description and number of decisive 
actions for current quarter and number of decisive actions from the previous 
fiscal year. 
 
6. Measure 2 – Bulk Cash:  Lists the description and amount of bulk cash 
seized/disrupted/jettisoned for current quarter and amount of bulk cash 
seized/disrupted/jettisoned the previous fiscal year. 
 
7. Measure 3 – Cases Supported: Lists the description and number of cases 
supported for current quarter and number of cases supported from the 
previous Fiscal Year. 
 
8. Measure 4 – Contacts: Lists the description and number of current or new 
contacts engaged in current quarter and number of current or new contacts 
engaged from the previous fiscal year. 
 
9. Measure 5 – Metrics: Lists the date and reason metrics were updated and 
verified along with a binary scoring system (Yes=1, No=0). 
 
10. Measure 6 – Selectors Run: Lists the case description and percent of 
intelligence selectors run per case for current quarter. 
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11. Measure 7 – Intel Tools Used: Lists the case description and percent of intel 
tools used per case for current quarter. 
 
12. Measure 8 – RFIs Answered: Lists the description and number of requests for 
information (RFIs) answered in current quarter and number of RFIs answered 
from the previous fiscal year. 
 
13. Measure 9 – CTF Events Attended: Lists the description and date of CTF-
related events attended in current quarter. 
 
14. Measure 10 – Certs Acquired: Lists the description and date of professional 
certificates acquired in current quarter. 
 
15. Measure 11 – CTF Articles: Lists the description and number of CTF-related 
articles studied in current quarter. 
 
16. Measure 12 – Language Prof: Lists the ILR scores of each employee and 
computes the percentage of employees at an ILR of 2 for listening, speaking, 
reading, and writing in current fiscal year. 
 
17. Measure 13 – SDR Created: Lists the description and number of source 
directed requirements (SDR) created by each employee in current fiscal year. 
 
18. Measure 18 – IC Products Review: Lists the description and number of 
intelligence community (IC) products reviewed by each employee in current 
fiscal year. 
 
To obtain a full copy of this BSC Excel document, please contact the Dudley 
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